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Abstract: Courts have opened tax guidance to procedural attack. Consequently, taxpayers
who are found to owe tax may challenge the validity of the guidance implementing the tax if
the procedure used by the Treasury Department in adopting the guidance failed to comply
with the Administrative Procedure Act, in particular, with notice-and-comment. This
increased willingness to consider tax guidance's procedural defects offers little to most
taxpayers unless they are also given a better means to raise procedural challenges. Under
current law and in most circumstances, generally, taxpayers can bring a challenge only after
they have been found to owe taxes in an audit and completed an internal IRS appeal process.
This delay in the ability to challenge guidance reduces the likelihood taxpayers will
challenge the procedure used to create a particular rule. Moreover, delayed litigation requires
taxpayers to plan their affairs under the umbrella of guidance that might not survive a
procedural challenge. To the extent procedural challenges are accepted in the tax context, this
Article argues Congress should narrowly repeal its prior limitations on pre-enforcement
litigation of those procedures. Everyone affected by the guidance should be permitted to
litigate procedural questions for a period of time post-promulgation without the necessity of
being found to owe taxes. This narrow exception would increase the certainty of tax guidance
and encourage greater public participation in the guidance-formation process in a way that is
sensitive to the fact that litigation imposes costs on the Treasury Department.
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INTRODUCTION
Politicians demand a more fair, more efficient, and simpler tax system
as the press rails against problems plaguing the tax system's
administration.' However, improving the tax system and making
substantive change to tax administration, whether or not considered
independently of the substance of the tax law, is not easy. Protecting
taxpayer rights while raising the revenue necessary to fund our
government is a complicated balancing act. That balancing requires
compromise resulting from a sensitivity to the push and pull between
taxpayers' rights (and some taxpayers' desire not to pay taxes) and the
system's administration (and the need for revenue).
Balancing these competing interests in the complicated world of
taxation is hard. It is made more difficult by the fact that tax is an area of
law recognized as unique and yet bound by general systems of law.
Historically, a silo evolved around taxation that allowed the tax system
to develop its own answers to procedural questions; that silo is now
being challenged. Those challenges often do not fully consider the
unintended consequences that arise when tax administration is forced
into ill-fitting procedures that work imperfectly for other government
2
agencies and were certainly not created with the tax system in mind.
* Professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. I would like to thank participants at
the Protecting Taxpayer Rights Symposium, University of Washington School of Law's Graduate
Tax Program, and the University of Dayton School of Law for their thoughtful feedback on earlier
drafts of this paper, and my colleagues Michael Solimine and Brad Mank, and the Harold C. Schott
Foundation for financial support.
1. See Naomi Jagoda, House Committee Votes to Censure IRS Head, HILL (June 15, 2016),
[https://perma.
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/283576-house-committee-votes-to-censure-irs-head

cc/WK4W-BGPW]; National Taxpayer Advocate Identifies PriorityAreas and Challenges in MidYear Report to Congress, IRS (July 16, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/national-

taxpayer-advocate-identifies-priority-areas-and-challenges-in-mid-year-report-to-congress
[https://perma.cc/ Z7NP-UG3G]; Jose Pagliery, IRS Taxpayer Data Theft Seven Times Larger than
Originally Thought, CNN (Feb. 26, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/26/technology/irs-datatheft/index.html [https://perma.cc/5Q6E-FH9P]; Hillary Clinton, A Fair Tax System, HILLARY
CLINTON

(Jan.

11,

2016),

https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/a-fair-tax-system/

and cut
[https://perma.cc/6EYH-B6K2] ("[r]estore basic fairness to our tax code" and "[s]implify

taxes for small businesses"); Donald Trump, Tax Reform that Will Make America Great Again,

https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/ tax-reform [https://perma.cc/Y6NV-74AR] (calling for
"simpler, fairer brackets" that will "spur economic growth"). The TaxProfBlog was on Day 1563 of
"The IRS Scandal" as of Aug. 19, 2017. Paul L. Caron, TAXPROF BLOG,
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprofL-blog/irs-scandal/ [https://perma. cc/248D-S3Q3].
2. See Bryan Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Priorto the Administrative ProcedureAct, 63

DUKE L.J. 1673, 1682 (2014); Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax
Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 21, 21 (2014); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution
Should Determine Whether an Agency's Explanation of a Tax Decision Is Adequate?: A Response

to Steve Johnson, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2014); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit
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This tension plays out in cases that would shoehorn tax guidance into
the mold created by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 3 The APA
"afford[s] parties affected by administrative powers a means of knowing
what their rights are and how they may be protected."' Unless
specifically carved out, all agencies that create informal guidance, as
opposed to formal rulemaking, are required to follow a procedure laid
out in the APA popularly referred to as notice-and-comment. An
agency is required to provide the affected public with notice of proposed
rules and consider the public's comments after a reasonable comment
period.
The Treasury Department often summarily relies on statutory
exceptions from the requirement for notice-and-comment when it issues
tax guidance.' Since 2011, when the Supreme Court warned in Mayo
Foundationfor Medical Education & Research v. United States7 that the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will not be granted special exemption
from administrative law, this reliance has come under attack.' This is
part of a wave of attacks against Treasury Department procedures that

Special, After All?, 63 DuKE L.J. 1897, 1901 (2014). See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahon,
The Perfect Process Is the Enemy of the Good Tax: Tax's Exceptional Regulatory Process, 35 VA.

TAx REV. 553 (2016); James Puckett, Structural Tax Exceptionalism, 49 GA. L. REV. 1067 (2015).
3. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 70-404, 60 Stat. 237. For cases on the
matter handed down in the last ten years, see Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United

States, 562 U.S. 46 (2011); Intermountain Ins. Serv. v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 211 (2010); Stobie Creek
Inv. LLC v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 636, 668 (2008); Lewis v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 48, 53-54
(2007); Complaint, Chamber of Commerce v. I.R.S., No. 1:16-cv-944 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016).
4. S. REP. No. 79-752, at 193 (1945); see also H.R. REP. No. 79-1980 (1946).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
6. More than forty percent of the 232 regulations published between January 1, 2003 and
December 31, 2005 are susceptible to APA challenge for failure to comply with the notice and
comment. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1727, 1740-59

(2007).
7. 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
8. See id.; Ellen P. Aprill, The Impact of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax

Reform, 65 NAT'L TAx J. 917 (2012); Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1153, 1778-86 (2008); Michael Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 365, 384-84, 387 (1998); Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Casefor Better Regulation of
Federal Tax Regulators, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 775 (1987). See generally Kristin E. Hickman,
Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEx. L. REV. 89 (2010); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead:
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1537 (2006); Kristin E.
Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REv. 465 (2013); Steven R. Johnson,
PreservingFairnessin Tax Administration in the May Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269 (2012); Leandra

Lederman, The Fight Over "FightingRegs" and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L.
REV. 643 (2012); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse According to Whom?, 15 FLA. TAX REV.
1 (2013); Kristin E. Hickman, Goodbye Tax Exceptionalism, 12 ENGAGE 1 (2011), http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/detail/goodbye-tax-exceptionalism [https://penna.cc/M4Q4-DHNX].
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are argued not to comply with the APA. As a result, what APA
compliance looks like in the tax context has been a hot topic. Despite a
need for clarity of the law, courts have yet to establish a coherent
jurisprudence on this issue.'
In other areas of law, agencies often litigate the application of the
APA to their guidance before the guidance is enforced against the
public." Pre-enforcement litigation can isolate procedural issues and
allow the public thereafter to focus on the substance of the rules as it
applies to their facts. This process is not currently available in the tax
context because of statutory and prudential prohibitions on preenforcement litigation on either substantive or procedural grounds."
Most challenges to tax guidance and the collection of tax are deferred
until after a taxpayer is audited, is found to owe tax, and completes the
agency's appeals process. These tax specific and general prudential
doctrines minimize the number and type of attacks the Treasury
Department faces even when the APA would otherwise permit the
challenge.
Only those taxpayers who are found to be in violation of the tax
guidance and who do not settle with the IRS have any ability to initiate a
judicial challenge of the guidance's procedural history. In most
instances, this potential tax litigation results from either refund or
deficiency suits. Refund litigation occurs when a taxpayer has paid taxes
2
or penalties and seeks to recover these payments.1 Deficiency litigation
challenges an IRS audit that determines taxes are owed but are not yet
paid.' 3 With a three-year statute of limitations for assessing liability, this
litigation may take place years after the tax return was filed. 14 Moreover,
only those who pursue litigation after this period of delay can initiate
procedural challenges-a small subset of all taxpayers. What most
9. See generally Balestra v. United States, 803 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussed in Part II);
Altera Corp. v. Comm'r, 145 T.C. 3 (2015).
10. See Balestra, 803 F.3d 1363; discussion infra Part II.
11. Judges could broaden the narrow exceptions so that some cases could be heard early.
Hickman suggests revising judicial interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory
Judgment Act "to allow some greater amount of ... judicial review of facial challenges to Treasury
regulations seems likely to resolve the problems . . ."; however, she recognizes that "a legislative
solution may be necessary" if that is insufficient. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at
1201-02. However, even after doing so the bulk of tax guidance would remain insulated from preenforcement juridical review. Moreover, the exceptions might increase taxpayer frustration and
confusion over when they can and cannot secure judicial review.
12. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2012).
13. See id. §§ 6211(a), 6213(a), 6512(b).
14. Id. § 650 1(a). The statute of limitations is extended to six years for substantial omission and
indefinitely if a return is filed fraudulently or no return is filed. Id. § 6501(c), (e).
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taxpayers may gain in that litigation is unlikely to offset the expense of
the litigation itself.
While Congress only permits procedural challenges late in the tax
collection process, this offers little to most taxpayers. The delay in
litigating procedural complaints reduces what is challenged and affects
taxpayer behavior throughout the period from its promulgation until
someone, eventually, challenges the procedures. In the process, delayed
litigation requires that taxpayers plan their affairs under the spectre of
guidance that might not survive a procedural challenge. Moreover, in
deciding whether to follow the tax guidance, taxpayers must not only
assess its substance but also the procedures used to create it under
procedural requirements that are not consistently interpreted by the
courts. It is for these reasons this Article proposes two narrow statutory
changes to permit pre-enforcement review of the procedures used to
create tax guidance.
Thus, this Article accepts the reality that courts will permit certain
procedural challenges to tax guidance, and with that acceptance argues
that a new method for hearing those challenges needs to be developed.
The right to procedural litigation should mean something. Instead of
waiting until after enforcement of the guidance, this Article proposes
that procedural challenges should be heard early, to the extent
constitutionally permissible. Thereafter, taxpayers may undertake their
tax compliance understanding what the law is. However, permitting this
early litigation is likely to increase the amount of litigation and its cost."
This cost requires constraining early and meaningful review so that it
does not consume all of the agency's resources.
Unless the system balances permissive litigation with an awareness of
limited agency resources, taxpayers have an incentive to overwhelm the
agency in litigation. Today, as courts and academics struggle to
determine exactly how application of the APA and notice-and-comment
will change the process for challenging tax guidance, this litigation has
been recognized as a means to change some tax outcomes. One Am-Law
100 law firm claims procedural challenges create "a unique opportunity"
to challenge the IRS and Treasury Department. 16 That these procedural

&

15. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking, 57 LAW

CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 185, 233-38 (1994).
16. Sena Akins & Geral Kafka, Latham & Watkins LLP, A New Argument for Contesting IRS
Audit Determinations, 65 Tax Executive 171, 179 (2013); see also Roger Jones et al., How to
Challenge Tax Regs on AdministrativeLaw Grounds, LAW 360 (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.law360.
com/articles/715380/how-to-challenge-tax-regs-on-administrative-law-grounds

[https://perma.cc/

&

L4QS-8DDF]; J. Walker Johnson & Alexis A. Macivor, Tax Controversy Alert, STEPTOE
JOHNSON LLP, http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/4472.pdf[https://perma.cc/J39D-98WS].

1322

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1317

challenges to the validity of tax guidance generally occur in the postaudit context risks breeding contempt for the tax system more than
fixing procedural problems.17 Additionally, the structure of the litigation
means that important procedural issues can never be brought in court.
Therefore, some procedural problems will continue unless Congress
steps in to protect taxpayer rights.
This Article proposes legislative changes to address some of the
problems created by post-audit procedural challenges; however, it is
important to know what this Article does not argue. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to debate the value of applying notice-and-comment
in the creation of tax guidance. There are good reasons to facilitate the
publication of guidance and to limit judicial review of agency
procedures, both generally and specifically in the tax context." The
IRS's budget has been reduced by twelve percent over the last ten years
when adjusted for inflation, and with the IRS's shrinking budget, there is
only so much that can be accomplished by an underfunded agency."
Increasing the amount of tax litigation for a greater number of
procedural claims could have several unintended consequences,
including impeding other agency activities that might be as important, if
not more so, for the protection of taxpayers' rights and reducing
government revenue. In a world of finite resources, it should not be
assumed that increasing an agency's administrative burdens is in
taxpayers' best interest.
Additionally, with the evolution of procedural litigation, it is possible
that APA procedures will be required of all IRS and Tax Court activities;
20
however, this Article limits itself to the creation of tax guidance. The
focus on guidance is because of the importance of this issue in litigation
today and because this study can serve as a model for how a narrow
procedural fix can address concerns without opening the floodgates to
litigation. In doing so, this Article urges temperance, rather than broad
sweeping changes of unknown consequence, to the administration of the
Academics are telling the bar to do so. See Steve Johnson, Using Administrative Law to Challenge
IRS Determinations,88 FLA. B.J. 81 (2014).
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra note 59.
19. Jeremy H. Temkin, Internal Revenue Service Budget Cuts Spell Trouble, 253 N.Y. L.J. (Jan.
22, 2015).
20. For example, recent cases have questioned whether the IRS must comply with the APA
when issuing determination letters assessing taxpayers' liability or in IRS programs operated to
increase compliance with foreign-held assets. See Maze v. IRS, 206 F. Supp. 3d 1 (2016); Reply
Brief for Appellant, Qinetiq U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r, 845 F.3d 555 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 152192), 2016 WL 1464112.
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nation's revenue raising regime. The most persuasive form of tax
guidance is regulations, but there is also lesser guidance, such as revenue
rulings and private letter rulings, that assist taxpayers in complying with
the tax law. In this Article, the broader term, "tax guidance," is used to
encompass all types of agency-created rules governing tax matters.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly describes the APA's
procedures for agencies to create rules. The notice-and-comment rules
are often considered onerous and to not perfectly accomplish their
objectives. There are exceptions to these procedures, but courts interpret
the exceptions narrowly.2 1 Part I also describes how tax guidance is
created in comparison to the APA procedures.
Part II then examines when the APA permits pre-enforcement
litigation of procedural issues and how a general presumption in favor of
pre-enforcement litigation does not extend to the tax context.22 Congress
enacted specific statutory limitations that prevent taxpayers from
challenging most tax laws and tax guidance before enforcement.
Additionally, prudential rules limit the ability to bring lawsuits against
the government more generally. These limits effectively overturn the
APA's default of early litigation over the procedures the APA requires
and reduce the likelihood of pre-enforcement procedural challenges to
tax guidance.
In Part III, the Article examines how, under current law, some
procedural matters are never litigated. First, no one is in a position to
challenge rules that favor small groups of taxpayers. Only those
benefited have standing to sue and they have little incentive to challenge
their own benefit, if this is even possible. Additionally, notices that
promise future regulations are likely not final rules for APA challenge or
ripe for litigation.23 Unfortunately, there is a cost of these timing and
scope of litigation limitations. Taxpayer rights and the law's consistency
are both jeopardized through delayed or limited litigation of procedural
violations.
Recognizing the importance of maintaining a workable tax system,
Part IV proposes two narrow statutory changes to address these concerns
about procedure. First, this Article proposes a statutory change to permit
narrow procedural challenges to the validity of tax guidance before
enforcement of the guidance is undertaken. The proposal permits
21. See infra Part l.
22. See also Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8 (focusing on why people do not make
APA claims in tax matters).
23. Lawrence A. Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax,

62 DuKE L.J. 829 (2012).
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litigation over substantive issues only to the extent necessary to clarify
that the regulations are consistent with the statutory language. To ensure
the Treasury Department and IRS are not inundated with procedural
claims and that rules are finalized, a limited time period should be
established to constrain when this type of procedural litigation can
occur, as currently required by some other agencies' rules.
This permissive approach to pre-enforcement litigation would settle
procedural issues and permit the law to proceed subject only to
substantive challenge. Although this would prevent some taxpayers from
making procedural challenges after learning too late of the application of
the guidance to their own circumstances, this proposal balances concerns
over taxpayer rights to challenge procedure with the need for settled
guidance to shape taxpayer activity. In the process, it should also
encourage more public attention to the guidance-making process.
The second proposal expands the group that can engage in these legal
challenges. To increase procedural review of favorable tax guidance,
Congress should provide standing for those who do not benefit from tax
expenditures by permitting "all persons" to sue over procedural claims.
Moreover, Congress should acknowledge the injury that tax
expenditures have on federal revenue and subsequently on the provision
of national services. Because of the far-reaching consequences of
narrowly tailored tax preferences beyond the immediate taxpayer, the
procedures used for creating the guidance must be democratic. Failure to
follow democratic procedures envisioned by the APA should be open to
public challenge.
The success of this second proposal depends upon the judicial
response. Courts may not accept that this latter proposal proves that a
case or controversy exists if they do not accept there is a real injury for
those not benefited by tax preferences. If courts do not accept this
congressional interpretation of the injury, neither those not benefited nor
those who are benefited have an injury. Therefore, those opposing the
procedure used to create the rule would only have recourse to Congress.
Appeals to Congress, however, would likely address the substance of the
rule and ignore procedural concerns.
The Article concludes that changing the law in these limited ways has
many benefits despite having some drawbacks. If Congress adopts these
two changes, the public could litigate procedural questions without the
necessity of being found to owe tax. This would validate the importance
of procedural issues and encourage greater compliance with the APA by
the Treasury Department. A limited window for those procedural
complaints would encourage public participation in the creation of tax
guidance when the ability to litigate remains open. Having early
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litigation would then allow tax guidance to apply to taxpayers who may
focus only on its substance. However, this proposal also means the IRS
is likely to face a wave of new litigation and need to devote more of its
dwindling resources to litigation. Despite this downside, in a world
where procedural attacks will occur, litigating early maximizes benefits
to both taxpayers and the government.

I.

PROCEDURAL CLAIMS AGAINST TAX GUIDANCE UNDER
THE APA

An agency does not have the discretion to develop rules using any
method it chooses. Instead, Congress prescribes the procedures for
creating rules in the APA, unless Congress expressly grants an agency
an exception from the generally applicable requirements. These
procedures were enacted in 1946, and since that time the rules have
grown through judicial interpretation. Nevertheless, ambiguities remain
and agencies must interpret the procedures for themselves as they craft
their rules. These interpretations are then subject to review by courts.
The Treasury Department is an agency subject to the APA unless an
exception applies. Therefore, general APA procedures are the backdrop
against which Treasury Department procedures are to be measured.
Although the Treasury Department says it complies with the APA, the
degree to which it does so has been debated.
A.

The APA's Rules as a Backdropfor Tax Guidance

The APA "afford[s] parties affected by administrative powers a
means of knowing what their rights are and how they may be
protected."2 4 To that end, when agencies forego formal hearings to
create rules, section 553 of the APA requires federal agencies to provide
the public with notice of a proposed rule as well as an opportunity to
comment on the proposal.2 5 The agency is then required to consider the
public's comments after a reasonable comment period before publishing
the rule as final.26 Unless specifically carved out, all agencies that create
guidance, including tax agencies, are required to follow this procedure,

24. S. REP. No. 79-752, at 193 (1945); see also H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 250 (1946).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). For purposes of notice and comment procedures, a rule is defined
broadly to encompass virtually any agency statement about what regulated parties must or should
do. Id. § 551(4).
26. The resulting rule must be published at least thirty days before it takes effect unless there is
good cause for a sooner effective date. Id. § 553(d).
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popularly referred to as notice-and-comment. This process has many
components that may be burdensome for agencies to satisfy.
The primary purpose of notice-and-comment procedures is to ensure
the public has a voice in the creation of the rules. Exception from these
procedures are limited in order to maintain a robust dialogue between
agencies and the public, but exceptions do exist to ensure other public
interests are not sacrificed in the quest for public participation. Many
contemporary attacks on the Treasury Department's process for issuing
tax guidance, regulations in particular, claim that the Department's
process fails to comply with the APA's notice-and-comment
requirements and does not fall within an exception.27
The requirements of notice-and-comment are extensive. For example,
notice is more than alerting the public to a proposed rule; it has many
nuanced requirements. Notice must "fairly apprise interested parties of
the issues involved in the proposed rule, so that [the public] may present
responsive data or argument," 28 and the "required specification of legal
authority must be done with particularity." 29 Courts treat this notice
requirement seriously, invalidating rules that fail to provide sufficient
factual details and rationales to permit the public a "fair chance" to
comment meaningfully.30 Therefore, the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM), typically published in the Federal Register, must include the
terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved.31 An agency adding critical material to the record
after the comment period risks judicial invalidation of the rule because
32
the public did not have time to respond to that new material.
Notice opens the agency's doors for any and all to submit comments
with any information they choose to share. There is no requirement that
the commentator be a party in a more litigious sense. And while the
APA does not establish a window for the submission of comments, a

27. See supra note 3.

&

28. S. REP. No. 79-752, at 200.
29. H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 258.
30. See, e.g., Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 714 F.2d 1290, 1298 (5th
Cir. 1983) (the Interstate Commerce Commission's failure to articulate the legal basis for a rule
"effectively deprived the petitioners of [the] opportunity to present comments").
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012); see also Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2009);
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Penobscot Indian Nation v. U.S. Dep't. of Housing
Urban Dev., 539 F. Supp. 2d 40, 50 (D.D.C. 2008).
32. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822, 833 (5th Cir. 2010); Idaho Farm Bureau
Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1402-04 (9th Cir. 1955).
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reasonable amount of time must be provided.33 Agencies typically allow
sixty days for comments.3 4
Following the comment period, the agency must consider "the
relevant matter presented" in the comments. The extent to which this
exchange between the agency and the public becomes a dialogue is
debated. For example, in Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal
Communications Commission,36 the majority treated the agency and
commentators as opposing litigants so that process itself was
emphasized to assure fairness to the commentators. 37 The dissent argued
that the decision-making process should be reviewed in its entirety, in
order to permit a long chain of public involvement to be evidence of
compliance with the APA. 3 ' This debate over procedural versus
substantive participation permeates discussion of the value to be given to
each section of the APA.
The fundamental meaning of notice-and-comment is critical because
an agency cannot substantially change a rule in response to comments
without starting the notice-and-comment process over again. Only those
changes that are a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule may be made
without restarting the process for fear that the public did not have
adequate notice or the opportunity to comment on the revised
language." If, and only if, the public "should have anticipated" the
change is it unnecessary to restart notice-and-comment. 40 Any change
that "materially alters the issues involved in the rulemaking" or
substantially departs from the proposed language requires re-notice.4 An
agency that fails to provide new notice-and-comment risks a court
invalidating the rule based on procedural faults.
Two cases illustrate some of the difficulties of the logical outgrowth
test. In South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental ProtectionAgency,4 2 the
agency modified a proposed rule that reduced pollution from motor
33. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
34. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GuIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 251-52, 272-74

(5th ed. 2012). Agencies may accept late comments at their discretion. Id. at 252.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
36. 652 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2011).
37. Id. at 445-47.
38. Id. at 473 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
39. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 160 (2007); Nat. Res. Def.
Council Inc. v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002).
40. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
41. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985).
42. 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
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vehicles by adopting specific measures, such as parking surcharges and
travel restrictions.4 3 The final rule eliminated the proposed measures
and, instead, imposed other measures, such as reducing parking
4
availability and increasing automobile inspections.4 The First Circuit
held the new measures were a logical outgrowth of the proposal because
they were "in character with the original scheme" and the agency had
announced in the notice that it would consider "all reasonable
alternatives."45
46
On the other hand, in Chocolate Manufacturers Ass'n v. Block, the
Department of Agriculture responded to a congressional amendment to
the federal food program that required supplemental foods for women,
infants, and children to have nutritional value.4 7 The Department
proposed maintaining the substitution of flavored milk for whole milk
but invited the public "to make recommendations for alternatives not
considered in the proposed regulations."4 8 The final regulation
prohibited the substitution, and the Fourth Circuit held that in "the
specific circumstances of this case" the revision was not a logical
outgrowth because the Department had previously permitted the
substitution and had not suggested deleting flavored milk.4 Therefore, in
order to delete flavored milk, the agency was required to re-initiate the
process, alerting the public to the proposed deletion.
The risk of invalidation for failing to restart the notice-and-comment
process leads to some degree of intellectual lock-in with proposed
language. Practical considerations of the cost and timing of redoing
notice-and-comment are in addition to people's natural propensity not to
change their minds, described in depth in the bounded rationality
scholarship."o This result caused Stephanie Stern to conclude that noticeand-comment actually reduces the value of public participation by
prematurely committing agencies to proposed rules."
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 656-57.
Id. at 657-58.
Id. at 658-59.
755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1107.
See BOUNDED RATIONALITY (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2002); MANCUR

OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

124 (1965);

Herbert A.

Simon, Bounded

Rationalityand OrganizationalLearning, 2 ORG. SCI. 125 (1991).
51. Stephanie Stem, Cognitive Consistency, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 589, 620-30 (2002); see also
Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1954-61
(2008).
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As a final step of notice-and-comment, the statute requires that final
rules be submitted to the Federal Register with a concise general
statement of its basis and purpose.52 Courts, however, have effectively
eliminated "concise" from this APA requirement.5 3 In Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,54 the Supreme Court urged lower
courts to engage in a "searching and careful" review of agency actions."
To facilitate that review, agencies must provide courts with a
contemporaneous administrative record of their decision-making in their
statements accompanying final rules. 56 In later litigation over the
procedure behind a rule, only those statements supplied with the final
rule are reviewable in support of the agency." Consequently, agencies
can use their own expertise to supplement the comments in their
rulemaking, but that expertise must become part of the administrative
record in a way accessible to the courts.
This exchange between the public and the agency is to encourage
public participation in the rulemaking process. Subjecting proposed
regulations to public scrutiny is expected to foster rational and informed
rulemaking.59 However, the notice-and-comment procedures the APA
imposes, which critics want to be applied more rigorously in the
formation of tax guidance, do not always accomplish these goals and
may inadvertently make it harder for agencies to move closer to the ideal
by increasing the cost of issuing guidance.
Some scholars argue these procedures have become onerous to
agencies and reduce the amount of rules and guidance that are
produced.60 Moreover, the level of review that is required for an agency
rule to be upheld is not predictable; Jerry Mashaw argues that courts
52. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
53. See Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
54. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
55. Id. at 416.
56. Id. at 420.
57. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
58. See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103-04 (1983); Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2005).
59. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1028-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Int'l Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
60. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1493
(2012) (responding to Yackee & Yackee, infra); Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the
Administrative Procedure Act More Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95 (2003); Jason Webb
Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of
FederalRegulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1414 (2012) (testing
rulemaking at the Department of the Interior).
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61
function as "robed roulette wheels" when reviewing agency guidance.
As a result, the notice-and-comment procedure is costly in terms of both
time and agency resources, while the procedure does not guarantee the
public good.
Recognizing a downside of notice-and-comment, even the APA does
not claim notice-and-comment must be applied in all circumstances.
Because notice-and-comment procedures are not always in the public's
best interest, the APA's exceptions ensure other public interests are not
sacrificed in the quest for public participation. Some exceptions are
specific subject matter exceptions for national priority circumstancesmilitary or foreign affairs-or for internal agency or government
business-agency management, personnel, or public property, loans,
grants, benefits, or contracts.62 These do not apply in the tax context
discussed in this Article.
More broadly, there is an exception for interpretive or procedural
63
rules and general statements of public policy. These excepted rules do
not have the force and effect of law, or alternatively, do not govern
substantive rights.' Instead, they offer guidance as to the agency's
interpretation of the law. In this way, interpretive guidance is the
agency's view of the law but not the agency's creation of law. The
existence of interpretive rules raises questions of the appropriate level of
deference courts should give this type of guidance. Agencies' authority
even to issue interpretive regulations is questioned, in part, because
distinguishing between interpretive and legislative rules is difficult for
agencies and even courts to do.
Finally, the APA recognizes an exception from notice-and-comment
when agencies have good cause to do so.65 Unlike interpretive rules,
rules created under the good cause exception have full force and effect
of law. Although not widely applied by courts, the good cause exception

61. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 181 (1997); Wendy E. Wagner,

Administrative Law, Filter Failure,and Information Capture, 59 DuKE L. J. 1321, 1360 (2010).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012).
63. Id. § 553(b)(A).
64. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001); Christensen v. Harris
County., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61-62 (1995); EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991); LUBBERS, supra note 34, at 64-77; Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative InterpretationsofLaw, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 516-17.

65. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012). There is a separate good cause exception to the standard thirtyday waiting period following their publication before regulations become effective. Id. § 553(d); see
also Riverbend Farms Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1992) (analyzing differences
between the good cause exception to the thirty-day waiting requirement and the good cause
exception to notice and comment).
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is authorized when compliance with the notice-and-comment procedure
is "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." 66
Therefore, regulations promulgated within this narrow exception avoid
notice-and-comment but have a similar effect as guidance that has gone
through notice-and-comment. This exception can be, at least at times, a
large "legal grey hole" through which agencies avoid judicial review of
agencies' procedure in making law. 6 7
B.

Tax Guidance'sPotential Violations

The Treasury Department and the IRS, as a bureau within the
Treasury Department, issue significant amounts of guidance that qualify
as rules subject to the APA. Congress granted the Secretary of the
Treasury Department, and subsequently the Secretary's designees, the
authority to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement" of the Code.6 8 Although most tax regulations proceed
through the notice-and-comment process, few adhere to a strict form of
notice-and-comment before their issuance. Currently, the Treasury
Department often summarily relies on the interpretive or good cause
exceptions for the issuance of tax guidance and sometimes issues legally
binding temporary regulations simultaneously with proposed
regulations, which then proceed through notice-and-comment. 69 These
procedures have come under legal and academic attack for failing to
comply with proper procedure.
One critique is over the Treasury Department's policy of often
simultaneously issuing proposed and temporary regulations, resulting in
a delayed comment period until after publication of guidance that is
binding. 70 The Treasury Department issues proposed regulations that
have completed internal review but still await public review at the same
time it issues temporary regulations.7 1 These temporary regulations have

66. 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(b)(B)

(2012).

67. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1095, 1125

(2009).
68. I.R.C.

§ 7805(a)

(2012).

69. See supra note 2.

70. The Code requires the Treasury Department to issue proposed regulations when it issues
temporary regulations, and proposed regulations presumably are subject to notice and comment.

J.R.C.

§ 7805(e); see also I.R.M. § 32.1.1.2.2.

71. Taxpayers cannot rely on proposed regulations to support a tax position or for planning

purposes unless the IRS clearly states otherwise, and proposed regulations are not binding on the
IRS, even though the IRS's policy is to follow them. I.R.M. § 32.1.1.2.2; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem.
CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003).
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the same authority as final regulations that completed both internal and
external review, despite rarely going through the notice-and-comment
process. 72 The speedy publication without public review subjects
temporary regulations to criticism while making them popular with the
Treasury Department." Although subject to debate, the Treasury
Department's modified form of notice-and-comment coupling temporary
and proposed regulations is also used by other agencies.74
The Treasury Department has argued, unsuccessfully, that Congress
blessed this simultaneous issuance arrangement in the tax context.
Congress provided a three-year period of effectiveness for temporary tax
regulations and required the simultaneous issuance of proposed
regulations. 76 The Treasury Department argued before the Tax Court that
this was a political trade-off permitting the continued, short-term use of
temporary regulations without notice-and-comment. If Congress
intended the trade-off, that intent was not made evident. Congress did
not make any purpose explicit in this situation as it has done in other
contexts.
An argument the Treasury Department also frequently makes to
bolster its procedure is that most of its regulations are interpretative and
therefore do not require notice-and-comment.78 This is consistent with
the Supreme Court's recent holding in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers

72. Id.
73. See Michael Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations,
44 TAx LAW 343, 364 (1991); Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 8, at 496 n.168;
Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, ChallengingTemporary Regulations, 3 HOUs. Bus. & TAX
L.J. 248, 253 (2003). See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Mark Thomson, Open Minds and
Harmless Errors, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 261 (2016); Steve Johnson, Intermountain and the
Importance of Administrative Law in Tax Law, 128 TAx NOTES 837 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson,
Intermountain]. The Treasury Department has issued a significant number of them since a backlog
of statutes needing guidance was enacted in the 1980s. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law,
supra note 8, at 498. In a study of 232 regulatory projects, from January 1, 2003 through December
31, 2005, more than one-third were issued with only post-promulgation notice and comment. See
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 6, at 1748-51.
74. Michael Asimow, Interim-FinalRules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 703, 726
(1999). Even the Administrative Conference of the United States endorsed the use of interim-final
rules. Notice: Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111 (Aug. 18, 1995).
75. See Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 211 (2010), rev'don other
grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
76. I.R.C. § 7805(e) (2012).
77. Congress explicitly permitted post-promulgation comments for regulations regulating the
Health Care Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 401(a), 110 Stat.
1936, 2073 (codified at I.R.C. § 9833 (2012)).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012).
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Ass'n 79 that interpretive rules do not require notice-and-comment even if
they significantly revise or change policies from a prior presidential
administration."o Despite the holding, three separate concurrences in
Mortgage Bankers stated concern that interpretive regulations were
subject to agency abuse."
The Treasury Department sources regulations to the authority for the
regulation and claims this sourcing justifies its expansive use of
interpretive regulations. Regulations can be initiated under any provision
of the Internal Revenue Code, but the Treasury Department interprets
the catchall provision that grants the Treasury Department the power to
issue "all needful rules and regulations" as the source of interpretive
regulations.82 Under this interpretation, the IRS believes that regulations
only require notice-and-comment because they are legislative
regulations when they originate from specific authority in a particular
Code provision." The Treasury Department claimed more than ninety
percent of temporary regulations were interpretive and that public
comment was not required.84
This distinction between interpretive and legislative regulations may
be invalid under administrative law." Most other agencies recognize all
regulations as legislative. 86 Focusing on the potential penalties taxpayers
face if they fail to follow interpretive tax regulations, Kristin Hickman
argues the distinction reflects a historical understanding no longer
consistent with changes in administrative law doctrine.87 According to
this argument, all tax regulations except those issued under the good
cause exception would need more arduous public review.
Congress is aware that the Treasury Department retains this
distinction between authorities and procedures. For example, pursuant to
the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis Act (RFAA), agencies must analyze
the impact of proposed rules on small businesses." The RFAA's
requirement generally applies only to rules that go through notice-andcomment, a process the Treasury Department contends only applies to
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206.
Id. at 1210-25.
I.R.M. § 32.1.2.8.
Id.
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 6, at 1748-51.
Asimow, supranote 73, at 358. See generally Johnson, Intermountain, supranote 73.
Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents,supra note 8, at 520.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2012).
-
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specific authority legislative regulations. Congress added a special
requirement applicable only to tax to include interpretive rules as well as
legislative ones.8 9 In the limited context of the RFAA, Congress
recognized that the Treasury Department makes a distinction and
eliminated its effect without eliminating the distinction itself.
Additionally, the IRS issues a tremendous amount of tax guidance
that receives less review than is given to regulations. Revenue Rulings
apply the law to particular factual situations. Revenue Procedures are
similar to Revenue Rulings but traditionally focus on procedural, rather
than substantive, aspects of the tax system. Public notices are equivalent
to rulings, but their value is derived from the fact they can be issued
more quickly in response to public concerns. 90 Less general are Private
Letter Rulings issued to particular taxpayers seeking binding guidance
for proposed transactions and numerous types of guidance issued to IRS
agents in the process of audits or on particular matters. These other
forms of guidance are made public as a result of the Freedom of
Information Act.9 1
There are claims that the Treasury Department and IRS fail to meet
the APA's procedural requirements for the creation of regulations and
these other forms of guidance. That failure is arguably subject to judicial
challenge and invalidation. To the extent the Treasury Department and
IRS are subject to the APA, they'must meet its procedural requirements,
even if the requirements are burdensome and may operate against the
public's best interests. The question for the next Part is how the failure
to follow proper procedure may be challenged.
II.

CURRENT LIMITATIONS ON PRE-ENFORCEMENT TAX
ATTACKS

In most instances the APA permits pre-enforcement litigation to
ensure final rules comply with the Act's procedural requirements before
the rules have far-reaching impact. In the tax context, however, specific
statutes carve out procedural issues (as well as substantive ones) from
litigation before the rules have been enforced against a particular
taxpayer. Additionally, traditional prudential justiciability rules prevent

89. Id. (the requirement applies to a general notice of proposed rulemaking or a "notice of
proposed rulemaking . .. for an interpretative rule involving the internal revenue laws of the United
States").
90. Rev. Rul. 87-138, 1987-2 C.B. 287.
91. John Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era,
64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35, 79-89 (1995).
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many people from litigating procedural issues regarding tax guidance.
There were, and remain, good reasons for imposing these restrictive
policies, but there are also costs of doing so. The need to use efficiently
judicial and agency resources and the interests of taxpayers and the
public often conflict in the midst of these challenges.
A.

APA Default FavorsPre-EnforcementLitigation

Section 701 of the APA establishes a presumption in favor of judicial
review of agency action.92 Only to the extent that "statutes preclude
judicial review" or the action is "committed to agency discretion by law"
are courts to abstain from evaluating the choices that agencies make.93
Thus, generally only express congressional action eliminates judicial
review of agency rulemaking. This broad pro-litigation floor does not,
however, open up all issues to litigation at all times. The APA provides
rules to guide a generally permissive pre-enforcement litigation process
that encourages early evaluation of procedural, and other, claims.
Courts accept that the APA encourages litigation unless Congress
expressly says otherwise or, alternately, in those rare instances where
"statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply." 94 Courts often narrowly interpret statutory language that
might limit judicial review.95 In Citizens to Protect Overton Park v.
Volpe,96 the Supreme Court found there was "law to apply" when the
law said the Department of Transportation was not to build highways
through parks if a "feasible and prudent" alternative existed. 97 The Court
ruled the choice of going through a park was subject to judicial review

92. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)2) (2012). Other statutory rules and executive orders, outside the
APA, also limit agency discretion in creating rules, but compliance with these requirements is not
reviewable by courts. For example, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and Executive Order
12,866 work to improve management within the federal government and are not intended "to create

any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any person in any judicial or
administrative action." 2 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2012); Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,744
(Oct. 4, 1993). Therefore, agencies cannot be sued for the violation of these requirements, although
it might affect their future funding and congressional or executive support.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(2).
94. S. REP. No. 752, at 212 (1945). For example, in CarolinaMed. Sales, Inc. v. Leavitt, 559 F.
Supp. 2d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2008), the court precluded judicial review on the grounds the provision in
the law regarding the "selection of items and services for competitive acquisition" specifically
insulated the decision from the courts.
95. See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 674 (1986). But see Block v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
96. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
97. Id. at 413.
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because there was no indication that Congress sought to limit the APA's
judicial review. Congress must indicate with a "showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a . . . legislative intent . . . [to] restrict access to

judicial review." 98
That pro-litigation perspective includes review of agency procedure
often requiring notice-and-comment as discussed in the prior Part. This
litigation may result in the court invalidating a rule if the agency acts
"without observance of procedure required by law."9 9 When an agency
fails to comply with the APA's requirements, as alleged for violations of
the notice-and-comment process, a court may conclude this warrants
invalidation of the rule. There is a "harmless error rule" in the
application of this judicial review, so that if a violation does not create
1
hardship, the court will not overturn the violation. 0 However, "an utter
failure to comply with notice and comment cannot be considered
harmless if there is any uncertainty at all as to the effect of that
failure."'o
Despite a pro-litigation perspective, there are limits on when
procedural claims can be brought under the APA. Cases alleging
violations of the APA in the creation of rules cannot arise until the rules
are "final." 102 This requirement protects the integrity of the
administrative process and prevents wasting judicial resources. The
Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spearl03 set the test:
As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency
action to be "final": First, the action must mark the
"consummation" of the agency's decisionmaking process-it
must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And
second, the action must be one by which "rights or obligations
have been determined," or from which "legal consequences will
flow."104

This requirement makes it difficult to challenge a policy statement or
a notice calling for further action. True policy statements may lack the
requisite force of law to determine rights or obligations or lead to legal

98. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (2012).
100. Id.
101. Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 96 (D.C. Cit. 2002).
102. For more on the confusing law that is finality, see Gwendolyn McKee, JudicialReview of
Agency GuidanceDocuments: Rethinking the FinalityDoctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371 (2008).
103. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
104. Id. at 177-78 (citation omitted).
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consequences.os Nevertheless, the form of the guidance itself is not
definitive as to whether the rule is final. 106 Guidance has been held not
final, so not subject to judicial review, despite having completed noticeand-comment. 107
However, recently the Supreme Court has defined final agency action
permissively to permit judicial review. In U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
v. Hawkes Co.,"os the Court held that a determination that the property
on which a company sought to mine contained regulated water was the
consummation of the agency's decision-making process and, therefore,
was a final rule permitting judicial review. 109 That the determination
could be revised based on new information did not make the
determination less final. The Court would not require the plaintiff to
await enforcement and risk "serious criminal and civil penalties" from a
violation in order to challenge the determination." 0
Litigation is also potentially limited by the fact that not everyone can
bring suit alleging a violation of the APA's procedures. The litigation
must meet the requirements of a "case or controversy" in Article III of
the United States Constitution, discussed below. Additionally, suits may
only be begun by a "person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute.

.

. "'" "Agency action" is defined to

include "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act....2
Therefore, with respect to guidance, someone must be harmed,
"adversely affected or aggrieved" by an agency's rule or, possibly,
failure to issue a rule. To this end, a discrete-action limitation precludes
broad programmatic attacks, such as the one rejected in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation,'13 in which the Court would not permit a

105. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 226 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
106. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Nat'l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698-702 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
107. See New Jersey v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 526 F.3d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 2008).
108. - U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
109. Id. at 1813; see also Sackett v. EPA,
U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
110. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., _ U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
112. Id. § 551(13).
113. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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wildlife group's challenge to "seek wholesale improvement" of a broadbased land use program.114
Courts may also decide that issues may not be litigated if they were
not first raised in the notice-and-comment process, if that process was
used, and may limit the extent of the challenge."' This limit applies
regardless of the import of a particular issue; an issue generally must be
first raised during the rulemaking process or else it is waived. In other
words, petitioners must first exhaust their administrative avenues before
1 16
proceeding to the courts even when the "failure is understandable."
This encourages participation in the rulemaking process, something
beneficial to the creation of all rules, including tax rules.
Unlike the rules regarding who can bring challenges and when those
challenges can be brought, enabling statutes generally determine the
forum of judicial review of agency rules. Most enabling statutes
containing judicial review provisions call for direct, pre-enforcement
review in circuit courts as opposed to district courts, with a notable
117
exception of the National Labor Relations Board. The Administrative
Conference recommended appeals to one of the courts of appeals when
(1) the rule is sufficiently significant that a district court decision would
likely be appealed or (2) the "public interest requires prompt,
8
authoritative determination of the validity of the rule."" The federal
district and circuit courts are less common avenues in the tax context as
most cases are litigated in the Tax Court, which permits tax litigation
1 9
after enforcement but before the payment of the taxes owed. '
Courts debate the justiciability of an alleged APA violation and not
the agency's enabling act. They generally hold that the APA is not an
independent basis of jurisdiction.1 20 When there is no specifically
applicable judicial review provision under the agency's enabling statute,
the petitioner should seek review in a district court through one of the
114. Id. at 891 (emphasis in original).
115. See City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
116. Small Bus. in Telecomms. v. FCC, 251 F.3d 1015, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
117. The Administrative Orders Review Act applies to limited agencies, not including the
Treasury Department, and provides for review in the courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012); see
also LUBBERS, supra note 34, at 391.

118. ACUS Recommendation 75-3, The Choice of Forum for JudicialReview of Administrative
Action, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,926, 27,926-27 (July 2, 1975).
119. I.R.S., DATA BOOK 63 tbl.27 (2015); see also I.R.C. § 7422 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(1)
(2012); Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958).
120. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1977). In tax, jurisdiction for refunds is
given to the federal district courts and United States Court of Federal Claims in 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(2012), and jurisdiction is given to the Tax Court in I.R.C. § 7442 (2012).
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general jurisdictional statutes. The most frequently cited provision is-the
federal question provision, which grants district courts "original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."l2 1 Under this claim there is no
jurisdictional amount requirement.
The jurisdictional basis can raise questions of when a case may be
122
heard. For example, in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
the FDA's
enabling statute did not grant pre-enforcement review, but the Supreme
Court permitted the litigation.123 The issue arose over certain drug
labeling, and the Court permitted the case to proceed on the basis that
there was "no evidence at all that members of Congress meant to
preclude traditional avenues of judicial relief," and the rules would have
an immediate and direct impact on manufacturers.' 2 4 The early challenge
prevented the manufacturers from having to violate the rules and wait
for enforcement. Since Abbott Laboratories,courts generally permit preenforcement review of regulations.1 25 Often temporary relief is requested
until the issue is heard by a court and will likely be granted if the court
finds the rule has immediate and important effects on businesses.' 2 6
Although Abbott Laboratories has reduced agencies' ability to use
ripeness as a defense against pre-enforcement litigation, the argument
has not disappeared. In a companion case to Abbott Laboratories, Toilet
Goods Ass' v. Gardner,127 the Court denied pre-enforcement review of
an FDA rule because it was not ripe, using the prudential rules to deny
hearing despite it being permitted under the APA.1 2 8 Although the
regulation allowing the Commissioner to suspend the certification of
additives when their manufacturer refused access to inspectors was final
and a legal issue, there was no clear immediate or irreparable impact.' 2 9
The rule would only apply if access was denied and action was
undertaken. At that time, the facts of the situation would be important.
Thus, relief is less likely if a court finds there is no immediate impact on
the business.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

28 U.S.C. § 1331.
387 U.S. 136 (1967).
Id. at 142, 152.
Id. at 142.
See JAMEs T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 13.2 (2016); RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7.3 (4th ed. 2004).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012).
127. 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
128. Id. at 162-64. For more on ripeness, see infra section II.C.
129. Id. at 162-64.
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The existence of APA challenges may have greater impact on the
agency and on taxpayers depending upon the standard courts use to
evaluate the perceived procedural violation. However, the standards for
reviewing perceived violations of the APA's procedures are uncertain.
The APA provides that the reviewing court will "compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" or "hold unlawful and set
130
aside agency action" if certain findings are made. In particular, if the
agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law" or "without observance of
131
procedure required by law" the rule is in violation of the APA.
Extending beyond substantive issues, a catch-all provision requires
agencies to not act arbitrarily and capriciously in their rule-making,
"picking up administrative misconduct not covered by the other more
specific paragraphs."l 32 Thus, the arbitrary and capricious test is the
traditional standard applied by courts for reviewing agency actions.
Courts tend to focus on the following: whether the record supports the
factual conclusion on which the rule is based; the rationality or
reasonableness of the policy conclusions underlying the rule; and the
extent to which the agency has adequately articulated the basis for its
conclusions.
Much of administrative law litigation applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard focuses on the substance of agency rules but
encompasses the procedures behind formation of the rule. Courts
question whether the agency has satisfactorily come to its substantive
conclusion through adherence to proper procedure. Reviewing courts'
interpretation of this standard has changed over time, sometimes
depends on the judge, and often depends upon the subject matter and the
133
perceived seriousness of the issue. The standard is both intrusive and
deferential. Some have argued that any distinction between arbitrary and
capricious, and other standards, at least the substantial evidence
standard, is "largely semantic."l 34 David Zaring concludes that courts
use basic reasonableness criteria in each of the standards used to
evaluate agency actions.135
130. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
131. Id. § 706(2)(A), (D).
132. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
133. See Paul R. Verkuil et al., Special Feature, A Blackletter Statement of Federal
Administrative Law, 54 ADlvN L. REv. 1, 42-43 (2002).
134. DataProcessing, 745 F.2d at 684 (citations omitted).
135. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REv. 135 (2010); see also Richard Pierce,
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For example, in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,136 the Supreme Court held that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's evaluation of the environmental effects of a
nuclear power plant's fuel cycle was a prediction "within its area of
special expertise, at the frontiers of science" so that the reviewing court
"must generally be at its most deferential" in its review of this type of
scientific conclusion.13 7 As long as the agency's assumptions were
"within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking," and the agency
"considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made," the Court was not to
second-guess the conclusion.' 38
On the other hand, in the same term the Court decided Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 1 '9
In State Farm, which involved the rescission of a rule requiring passive
restraints in new cars, the Court held that the Court was "not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency":
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise. 140
The reasoned justification demanded in State Farm requires courts
take a hard look to ensure an agency has adequately considered all
comments and that the agency has adequately supported its contested
assumptions. Courts undertake this review after-the-fact. Only once the
agency successfully proves it has considered all comments is the court to
exercise constraint and uphold the agency's action. 141
This test for evaluating whether there is a violation of APA
procedures in pre-enforcement litigation is significantly tougher on the
agency when courts apply the State Farm hard look review. Under the
hard look review, courts are required to examine the administrative
Jr., What Do the Studies ofJudicialReview ofAgency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. 77, 95-96
(2011).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

462 U.S. 87 (1983).
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104-05.
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Id. at 43.
See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-51 (1970).
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record created at the time of the promulgation of the final guidance and
any explanatory materials accompanying the guidance. From that data,
courts review the methodology, the criteria applied, the relevant factors
14 2
and options considered, and the explanation of all of these items.
When a court finds that the creation of a rule violates APA
43
procedures, the normal response is to remand the rule to the agency.1
Agencies can often retain parts, or even all, of a remanded rule. Of the
D.C. Circuit's sixty-one remands of legislative rules between 1985 and
144
1996, in only twelve did the agency not recover from the remand.
Thus, in most instances, through the remand procedure, agencies are
able to promulgate similar rules but using correct APA procedure.
During the period of remand, the court can choose whether or not to
vacate the remanded rule. With vacatur, the rule that was promulgated
45
through inappropriate procedures is no longer binding.1 Daniel
Rodriguez argues that remand without vacatur is used "to temper the
draconian impact of hard look review," but, in the process, "it facilitates
the use of more aggressive judicial scrutiny" by offering this means of
6
softening the judgment. 14
Some judges use their discretion as to the choice of approach in any
given case, and many judges consider the damage to the public interest
47
from setting aside the rule before doing so.' However, other judges do
not accept that the statute provides this discretion. They interpret the
language of the APA as requiring they vacate the rule because section
706(2)(A) provides that a reviewing court confronted with a
8
procedurally invalid rule shall "hold unlawful and set aside" the rule."'
9
This is a minority position, and most rules are not vacated.14 In twenty142. Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification ofRulemaking, 75 TEx. L. REV.
525, 527 (1997).
143. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
144. William S. Jordan, III, OssificationRevisited, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393, 418 (2000).
145. For evaluation of the vacatur, see Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea, 53 DUKE L.J. 291

(2003) (defending remand without vacatur as act of discretion); Boris Bershteyn, Note, An Article I,
Section 7 Perspective on Administrative Law Remedies, 114 YALE L.J. 359 (2004) (using public
choice to support vacatur); Kristina Daugirda, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur, 80

N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (2005) (arguing that remand without vacatur is justified where costs ofvacating
are particularly high).
146. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Gift Horses and Great Expectations, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601
(2004).
147. See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Int'l
Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 966-67
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
148. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 491-93 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J., dissenting).
149. See Jordan, supranote 144, at 410.
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eight of sixty-one studied cases, William Jordan found the D.C. Circuit
did not even explicitly state whether the rule was vacated on the
assumption it would not be. "0
Thus, the APA generally permits pre-enforcement litigation of
agencies' procedural violations in the creation of rules. However, this
permission is not universal, and the likelihood that a court will remand a
rule for a violation is uncertain in any given instance. Nevertheless, the
APA does provide a tool for those affected by agency action to ensure
procedures are applied fairly. That agencies know they may be subject to
challenge likely increases their respect of process in their activities. With
historically little judicial oversight in the tax context, there is less of an
external constraint on the Treasury Department's actions. One study
found that over forty percent of tax regulations were developed without
following the traditional notice-and-comment procedure, most of those
without stating the basis for failing to do so.' Pre-enforcement
litigation would likely mitigate this failure.
B.

Statutory Limitations

Although the APA applies to the Treasury Department and the IRS,
its general preference for pre-enforcement litigation is not the norm in
tax because of longstanding specific statutory prohibitions. Neither the
assessment of tax nor its collection can be challenged before
enforcement actions have been undertaken because of the Tax AntiInjunction Act'5 2 and an exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act."'
As specific statutory enactments, these statutes trump the APA as a
general statute. These acts ensure that the tax system operates with
minimal litigation except as the law applies to specific taxpayers.
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act are often
interpreted coextensively, although they target different forms of relief
that a court could grant.154 The Anti-Injunction Act, now in section 7421
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 410, n.88.
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supranote 6, at 1749-50.
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
I.R.C. § 7421 (2012). There are narrow statutory exceptions provided in each act. For

example, taxpayers can seek Tax Court review of determinations whether they are employees for
employment tax purposes. Other provisions grant relief pre-enforcement. For example, I.R.C.

section 7476(a) and I.R.C. section 7478 permits taxpayers to have Tax Court review of
determinations regarding qualification of retirement plans or applicability of state and local bonds.
154. See, e.g., Ambort v. United States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004); Sigmon Coal Co.
v. Apfel, 226 F.3d. 291, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2000). "[T]he federal tax exception to the Declaratory
Judgment Act is at least as broad as the prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act." Alexander v. "Ams.
United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 n.10 (1974). The Tax Anti-Injunction Act should not be confused
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of the Internal Revenue Code, denies injunctive relief by generally
disallowing "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax [to] be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed."'"' The Declaratory Judgment Act contains a broader tax
exception that prevents courts from providing declaratory relief for
controversies "with respect to Federal taxes."l5 6
Courts have normally interpreted these provisions broadly, and the
Supreme Court has declared that the Anti-Injunction Act was to result in
"a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference" in the realm of
taxation."' Therefore, injunction and declaratory judgment litigation
over tax issues is frequent but rarely successful."' Kristin Hickman
notes that most cases barred by the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory
Judgment Act are "unsurprising applications" against tax protesters
"raising frivolous legal arguments already rejected by the courts" or
those "asserting technicalities to avoid levies or property seizures for
taxes clearly owed."s' But even when issues are framed as
constitutional challenges, "the courts have declined to adopt a general
exception from I.R.C. § 7421 [the Anti-Injunction Act] and the DJA
[Declaratory Judgment Act], concluding (probably rightly) that such an
exception would quickly swallow the rule." 60
There are two limited common law exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act that permit pre-enforcement tax
litigation. First, in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,1"' a
unanimous Supreme Court established a rule permitting pre-enforcement
with the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012), first enacted in 1793, which limits the ways
federal courts can enjoin state court proceedings.
155. I.R.C. § 7421 (2012).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
157. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Hickman, A Problem of
Remedy, supra note 8, at 1169.

158. See Paul H. Asofsky, Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Federal Tax
Controversies, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 785, 786 (1975).
159. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1166-67.
160. The Supreme Court has identified a revenue-raising function as a justification for these
limitations, with recourse in a suit for a refund. See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,
370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962); Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1166-67. Neither
provision's legislative history provides much evidence of congressional intent, although the
common law antecedent similarly precluded courts of equity from interfering with tax collection.
Asofsky, supra note 158, at 787-88; Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1166-67;
Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition,49

HARv. L. REv. 109, 109 (1935).
161. 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
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litigation if "it is clear that in no circumstances could the Government
ultimately prevail" and, in addition, "the taxpayer would suffer
irreparable injury if collection were effected."1 6 2 This may be an
impossibly high threshold.
The issue in Williams Packing was whether a company was the
employer of its boats' crews and therefore liable for employment taxes.
The company furnished boats to captains who hired their own crews but
who then sold their fish to the company. The lower courts found an
irreparable injury permitting jurisdiction because the company would be
forced into bankruptcy if it had to pay the taxes before requesting a
refund. Despite establishing the test for when jurisdiction would be
available, the Court held jurisdiction was barred in Williams Packing.
This company could not have pre-enforcement review because the
government's claim was "not without foundation" when using the "most
liberal view of the law and the facts."' 63 If the Court had to go to the
merits because there was the possibility of government success, it would
contravene the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act.
Williams Packing added a prong to the earlier, more lenient approach
adopted in Miller v. StandardNut Margarine Co.'" In StandardNut, the
Court had permitted "extraordinary and exceptional circumstances" to
establish equitable relief to justify pre-enforcement review despite the
Anti-Injunction Act.' In that case, the IRS told Standard Nut that the
company was immune to an excise tax on oleomargarine based on a
precedent that established margarine was not subject to the tax. 16 6 The
IRS then reversed its position and tried to collect the tax.' 6 7 The Court
held that the discriminatory enforcement of the tax against Standard Nut
but not its competitors plus the company's financial losses during the
litigation provided a basis for equity jurisdiction.16 Going forward,
application of this more lenient standard "virtually negated the AntiInjunction Act" and did "violence to the plain words of the statute."' 69
Williams Packing eliminated this lenient policy and shifted focus to the
merits of the claim.
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id. at 7-8.
164. 284 U.S. 498 (1932); see also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 62 (1922).
165. 284 U.S. at 510.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Asofsky, supra note 158, at 792; Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless FederalTaxing Power, 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 622-23 (1985).
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The Supreme Court has since concluded that "Williams Packing was
7
the 'capstone' of judicial construction" of the Anti-Injunction Act. e
Relying on the requirement that the government not have any chance of
winning, in United States v. American Friends Service Committee,171 the
Court refused to hear a case regarding a pre-enforcement challenge to
withholding. 72 Recognizing that requiring these taxpayers to sue for a
refund of withheld taxes would frustrate their chosen method for
demonstrating religious opposition to the Vietnam War and that there
were other ways the government could collect the tax, the Court still
applied the Anti-Injunction Act.173 The Court reinforced its desire to
"end [the] cyclical departures from the Act's plain meaning."174
To satisfy the first prong of the Williams Packing test, the case must
egregiously operate against the government. It must be "apparent that,
under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States
cannot establish its claim. .. .""' The Court of Appeals held in a later
case that the IRS must "flout[] the express terms of the Code, or lack[]
any factual basis for the assessment of taxes against an individual
taxpayer."176 The taxpayer must prove that the government could not
win under any circumstances, a high burden indeed.177 In the case of
Investment Annuity Inc. v. Blumenthal,"' the D.C. District Court would
not permit review of an IRS revenue ruling that investment annuity
contracts were not eligible for favorable treatment, despite this making
the matter never reviewable by a court. According to the court, the AntiInjunction Act would only have to yield "when the denial of judicial
review rises to the level of a constitutional infirmity."l79
To satisfy the second prong, the taxpayer must suffer irreparable harm
from being denied relief. Unlike in the earlier Standard Nut, this is not a
test of the taxpayer's individual situation but whether relief is ever
granted under law. Effectively nullifying this exception, a taxpayer's
opportunity to sue for a refund generally negates the irreparable

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. 419 U.S. 7, 9-10 (1974).
419 U.S. 7 (1974).
Id. at 9-10.
Id.
Id.
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
But see Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 631-32 (1976).
609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Inv. Annuity, 609 F.2d at 6.
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injury." Unsurprisingly, courts rarely apply Williams Packing to find
jurisdiction."'
A second exception permitting pre-enforcement litigation despite the
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act was established in
South Carolinav. Regan.'8 2 This exception permits review when there is
no other legal remedy available. In Regan, the state of South Carolina
sought declaratory and injunctive relief when the IRS denied interest on
its state bonds and exclusion from holders' gross income.183 South
Carolina argued it could not seek a refund as it was not the affected
taxpayer.184 The Court concluded there was no other legal remedy
available.' This exception is often narrowly construed.'
Similar to Regan, cases that involve increasing other people's taxes
might not be limited by the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory
Judgment Act. In McGlotten v. Connally," a black man denied
membership in a fraternal lodge because of his race was permitted to
bring a class action to enjoin the Treasury Department from granting tax
benefits to racially discriminatory groups." The lower court held that
the action has "nothing to do with the collection or assessment of taxes"
and the plaintiff is unable to raise "his objections in a suit of refund." 89

180. United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. 419 U.S. 1, 11 (1974); Alexander v. "Ams.
United," Inc. 416 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1974). But see Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
181. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1171; see also Estate of Michal v. Lullo,
173 F.3d 503, 506-07, 512 (4th Cir. 1999); Lampert v. United States, No. 87-2421, 1989 WL
104459, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1989); Ponchik v. Comm'r, 854 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (8th Cir.
1988).
182. 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
183. I.R.C. § 103 (2012); Regan, 465 U.S. at 372.
184. Regan, 465 U.S. at 379-80.
185. Id.
186. Ryo Mach., LLC v. Dep't of Treasury, 696 F.3d 467, 472-73 (6th Cir. 2012); SEC v.
Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 297 F.3d 127, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2002); Nat'l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United
States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
187. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
188. Id. at 453-54; see also Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 48990 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889,
892-94 (D.D.C. 1974). The Southern District of New York concluded, "[t]hird party suits to compel
tax collection as a means to vindicate plaintiffs' rights do not pose the threat of clogging the federal
revenue pipeline that taxpayer-sought injunctions would present because third party suits are 'few
and far between."' Regan, 544 F. Supp. at 489 (quoting Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 836 n.52
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
189. McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 453-54.
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The court looked to the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act as a tax
increasing measure to create this exception.
In addition to these two exceptions, challengers have also avoided the
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act when courts find that
the Acts do not apply. Possibly creating a new exception, the Supreme
Court recently circumvented the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory
Judgment Act's limitation on pre-enforcement litigation with an
interesting turn of language of what constitutes a "tax." In National
90
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 the Court held the
healthcare mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 was a tax for purposes of the Constitution but not for purposes of
the Anti-Injunction Act.' 91 Two former IRS commissioners, Mortimer
Caplin and Sheldon Cohen, filed an amici curiae brief arguing the AntiInjunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act prevented preenforcement judicial review of the mandate.19 2 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court distinguished between a "tax" for statutory and
constitutional bases, denying the application of the Anti-Injunction Act
and the Declaratory Judgment Act to the penalty that is administered
through the tax system.193
Consistent with this reasoning, earlier the Supreme Court found the
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act did not limit certain
pre-enforcement challenges because the regulation did not implicate the
statutory language of "for the purpose of' or "with respect to" the
''assessment or collection" of a tax required by the Anti-Injunction Act
or Declaratory Judgment Act. 19 4 This language has been debated, and the
results may come down to fine points of language or what the regulation
requires. According to the Supreme Court, the regulation's connection to
tax collection does not have to be direct to warrant application of the
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act. 195
190. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
191. Id. at 546, 574; see also Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, "Early-BirdSpecial" Indeed!:
Why the Anti-Injunction Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum Coverage Provision,
121 YALE L.J. F. 389, 397-99 (2012); Steve R. Johnson, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Individual
Mandate, 133 TAx NOTES 1395, 1399-1400 (2011); Kevin Walsh, The Anti-Injunction Act,
Congressional Inactivity, and Pre-Enforcement Challenges to § 5000A of the Tax Code, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 823, 838-43 (2012).
192. Johnson, supra note 191, at 1399.
193. Nat'lFed'n, 567 U.S. at 564-67.
194. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012); Tax Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C.
§ 7421 (2012).
195. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 739-40 (1974); Alexander v. "Ams. United,"
Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1974). However, Congress permits this review for tax-exempt status in
I.R.C. § 7428 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
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For example, in Bob Jones University v. Simon,19 a private university
sought injunctive and declaratory relief from an IRS plan to withdraw its
tax-exempt status.19 7 The university had received a determination of its
tax-exempt status in 1942, but in 1970 the IRS changed its position so
that private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies
would not be granted tax-exempt status.' Although the university
claimed the issue was not its tax obligation but its flow of contributions,
the Court did not accept this because of the consequence it would have
for the institution's tax liability. 199 That there may be non-tax-related
motives "ignores the fact that petitioner has not shown that the Service's
action is without an independent basis in the requirements of the
Code." 20 0 Consequently, the Court applied the Anti-Injunction Act and
denied hearing. If there were "no access at all to judicial review . .. our
conclusion might well be different," but because there would be an
opportunity to litigate when the university has taxable income or pays
employment taxes, the litigation was delayed.201
Similarly, in Alexander v. "Americans United, " Inc.,202 another
nonprofit organization sought to challenge its loss of tax-exempt
status. 203 This organization, with a stated purpose to defend and
disseminate information regarding the separation of church and state,
received a letter ruling from the IRS in 1950 classifying it as a section
501(c)(3) tax-exempt entity.20 When the IRS found in 1969 that a
substantial part of the organization's activities were lobbying for
legislation, not permissible for a section 501(c)(3) entity, the IRS
revoked the letter.205 The organization sought injunctive relief requiring
its reinstatement as a tax-exempt organization. The IRS permitted it to
be a 501(c)(4) entity, also exempt from tax, but donations would not be
deductible by donors under section 170.206 This latter tax effect was
sufficient to prevent pre-enforcement review, especially as the entity
could litigate the issue in a refund of unemployment taxes. The Court
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

416 U.S. 725 (1974).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 734-35, 739-40; Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 738-39.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 746.
416 U.S. 752 (1974).
Id. at 755-56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was not swayed by the fact that the organization raised constitutional
matters or that it was not the organization's own taxes that were at
issue. 207
Continuing the high hurdle for those seeking to challenge Treasury
Department rules, in Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow, 208 decided in 2006, the
D.C. District Court disallowed pre-enforcement review of rules requiring
the reporting of information about the purchasers of delinquent
consumer loans. 209 Although the possible tax liability was for those who
sold the loans, it was the buyers who had to file reports of the purchases.
The court held this reporting requirement helps the IRS determine
whether other taxpayers pay their taxes. The issue for the court was that
"any action that hinders the IRS in determining the accuracy of [reported
gross] income will in fact hinder the assessment and collection of
taxes .. "210 Because the purchasers could file a penalty-refund suit,
they were not without recourse.
For a moment, the pendulum appeared to swing back in the D.C.
District Court in 2014 in Florida Bankers Ass'n v. Department of
Treasury.211 The lower court held that the Anti-Injunction Act and
Declaratory Judgment Act did not prevent a challenge to regulations
requiring banks to report interest income earned by aliens from certain
treaty countries.2 12 Although this interest is not taxable in the U.S.,
according to the Treasury Department, the information is necessary to
comply with information-sharing agreements with other countries. The
Bankers Association argued the Treasury Department acted arbitrarily
and capriciously by failing to consider that some people would withdraw
2 13
funds from U.S. banks in response to the reporting requirement.
The lower court permitted review of the regulations but found in
favor of the government. The district court concluded that the
regulations did not restrain the assessment or collection of taxes but only
imposed a reporting requirement. 214 The district court went on to hold
215
that the Treasury Department did not act arbitrarily and capriciously.
Banks do not owe tax on the reported income even though a penalty,
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 759-61.
481 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 9.
19 F. Supp. 3d. Ill (D.D.C. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.

215. Id. at 120-21.
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defined in the Code to be a tax, attached, if a bank failed to meet its
reporting requirements.216 Under the lower court's reading, the AntiInjunction Act does not apply to reporting requirements. Although the
court ultimately sided with the government, it lessened the government's
protection from pre-enforcement procedural litigation.
However, this decision was overturned by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals on the grounds that the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory
Judgment Act did, in fact, bar the suit. 2 17 The circuit court held it was
not permissible to circumvent the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory
Judgment Act by challenging only the regulatory aspect of a regulatory
tax. The issue for the court was that the challenge to the regulation also
challenged the tax for failure to comply (although termed a penalty).
According to the circuit court, FloridaBankers Ass'n differs from the
1987 case Foodservice and Lodging Institute, Inc. v. Regan218 because
the penalty attached to the reporting requirement reviewed in 2014 was a
tax under the Code.219 In Foodservice, the penalty was not itself listed in
the provision governing taxes.2 2 0 Therefore, of four regulations
questioned in Foodservice, the plaintiffs were allowed to challenge one
that required restaurants to report the amount of tips collected in a given
year because that regulation was to provide "data useful for assessing tip
compliance," but no tax attached for the failure to comply. 221' Although
the court in Foodservice ultimately concluded that the Treasury
Department "considered and reasonably rejected the appellant's
concerns" in this fourth regulation, the critical issue was that procedural
challenges to the reporting requirement were not off limits because of
the Anti-Injunction Act or Declaratory Judgment Act in cases where
penalties are not designated as taxes.222
Belying the support courts give to the tax system in cases involving
the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act, the government
did not raise these challenges in Loving v. IRS,223 showing that the
216. I.R.C. §§ 6721, 6671 (2012). The penalty is in Chapter 68 Subchapter B per section 6721.
Section 6671(a) defines penalties imposed by Title 26, including Chapter 68, Subchapter B, as taxes
unless otherwise provided.

217. Fla. Bankers Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
218. 809 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
219. Id. at 846. But see California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1981) (California's
reporting requirement pursuant to ERISA is subject to the Declaratory Judgment Act).

220. Foodservice, 809 F.2d at 846.
221. Id. The other regulations involved the assessment of tax and the employer could "refuse to
comply, pay the statutory fine, and sue for a refund of the fine." Id. at 843-45.
222. Id. at 847.
223. 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff'g 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that IRS
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government recognizes there are limits to these protections. In Loving,
decided in 2014, the taxpayer won a pre-enforcement challenge to tax
regulations that imposed competency testing, continuing education, and
ethics requirements on tax return preparers.2 24 The link to tax assessment
and collection was too tenuous for the government to raise AntiInjunction Act claims. The Court held the IRS did not have statutory
authority for the regulations and permanently enjoined them.
There is scholarly concern over the application of these statutory
prohibitions to pre-enforcement challenges. Early discussions of these
statutes teased out when tax cases could be heard because, as mentioned
above, the provisions do not prevent all pre-enforcement litigation.225
More recently, these provisions are often recognized, and critiqued, as
exceptional, compared to the general preference for pre-enforcement
litigation in other areas of law. 2 26 The focus has turned to the problems
with delaying tax litigation over procedural and substantive matters until
a refund claim or deficiency litigation. 2 27 As discussed more fully in the
next Part, concerns today generally accept that the law permits the delay
of certain issues coming before a court but are frustrated by the results.
C.

PrudentialLimitations

In addition to statutory limits on pre-enforcement tax litigation,
justiciability doctrines, such as standing and ripeness, complicate the
prospects for litigation over the procedures used to create tax guidance.
Justiciability doctrines derive from the Constitution's cases and
controversies requirement. 228 Some of these limitations can be waived,
but some may not. Many agencies are increasingly, and successfully,
raising these challenges to limit judicial review of their actions.22 9
Historically, justiciability was rarely raised in the tax context because
of the existence of the statutory limitations on litigation discussed

failed to object in lower court to the remedies and the court found them appropriate).
224. Id.
225. Scholars were divided over the appropriate level of judicial review outside of the audit
context. See Asofsky, supra note 158, at 786; James Lenoir, Congressional Control Over Suits to
Restrain the Assessment or Collection ofFederal Taxes, 3 ARIz. L. REv. 177 (1961); Norton, supra
note 169 at 622-23.
226. See supra note 8.
227. These limits on pre-enforcement litigation are unlikely to reduce Treasury Department prepromulgation work because of potential challenges in the event of enforcement activity. See
Murphy, supranote 2, at 23.
228. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
229. Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 ILL. L. REv. 957, 960.
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above.230 Consequently, few studies focus on justiciability and taxation
because of the limited number of tax standing cases. Non-tax specialists
tend to lump tax with other cases on standing, often ignoring any
interaction with the Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment
Act.2 3' Therefore, only in narrow circumstances is standing likely to be
an issue in tax. These prudential concerns most often apply to third
parties seeking judicial intervention against the IRS rather than affected
taxpayers.2 32 The two aspects of justiciability likely to become issues for
pre-enforcement tax litigation are standing and ripeness.
First, with respect to standing, over the years the Supreme Court has
created a framework for what is required for a case to have standing in
the courts. Without standing, a case must be dismissed without
consideration of the case's merits. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,233
the Court wrote:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."' Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury
has to be "fairly . .. trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . .. th[e] result [of] the independent action

of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be
"likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will
be "redressed by a favorable decision."2 34
Thus, standing requires an injury in fact, a causal connection between
that injury and the law that is challenged, and that the court's decision
could redress the injury.
In order to establish an injury in fact, the plaintiff must prove the
injury. How strictly this requirement is to be interpreted has varied over
time.235 Injuries are often defined broadly and recognized as to
230. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1174-76.
231. E.g., Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the
Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REv. 377, 433-34 (2009); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A
Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 655-56 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein,
InformationalRegulation and InformationalStanding: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613,
615-17 (1999).
232.
233.
234.
235.

Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1175.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998);

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1354

"'aesthetic,
values."

23 6

[Vol. 92:1317

conservational, and recreational' as well as economic
However,

abstract

and

indefinite

injuries

are

not

constitutionally cognizable injuries, so there can be no judicial review.
Concrete, though widely shared, injuries might pass the threshold.237 In
2016, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,23 8 the Supreme Court reiterated that the
injury must be "particularized" and concrete.239 In that case, procedural
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act alone were insufficient to
establish an injury in fact, despite congressional designation of an
intangible harm.240
An agency's failure to follow proper procedures must fit within this
rubric in order to be justiciable. Thus, there is a hurdle despite a Justice
Antonin Scalia footnote that 'procedural rights' are special." 241
Nevertheless, the Court would not recognize that violation of a
congressionally-conferred right to everyone of "an abstract, selfcontained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe the
procedures required by law" creates an injury in fact.242 The footnote has
been interpreted as accepting that a "justiciable claim may be presented
by the agency's failure to comply with statutory mandates" in a more
narrowly defined way.243 For example, a court found that an agency
permitting an interested party to have ex parte communications,
prohibited as a procedural matter in a formal proceeding, adversely
affected "particularized interests in fair decision making" and was
therefore be justiciable.24 4
Nevertheless, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez,245 the Supreme
Court suggested that procedural harms alone are unlikely to suffice as an

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871
(1990); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
236. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (citations
omitted).
237. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25.
238. _ U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
239. Id. at 1548.
240. Id. at 1550.
241. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (challenging regulation that
other agencies must confer with Secretary of the Interior under the Endangered Species Act only in
limited circumstances).
242. Id. at 573.
243. Cynthia R. Farina, Standing, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REViEW OF FEDERAL

AGENCIES 17, 35 (John Fitzgerald Duffy & Michael E. Herz eds., 2005).
244. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1255, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
245. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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injury in fact unless there is proof that this harm caused an injury to
concrete interests. 246 The procedural right at issue must protect concrete
interests to permit the person to litigate the right, and statutory grants of
these rights only avert the need for the litigant to prove redressability
and immediacy. In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,24 7 being deprived
of the ability to comment on regulations was insufficient to show an
injury in fact even though the procedural right was granted by
Congress.248
Furthermore, the plaintiff must prove a link between the procedure
and substantive agency action.249 This is the case even if it leaves
plaintiffs waiting for enforcement. For example, courts may require
taxpayers to wait until after penalties are assessed before they are
allowed to challenge the procedure regarding the rule. In Stephenson v.
Brady,250 the plaintiff alleged, in part, that required informational returns
referenced in the regulations were invalid because they had not gone
through notice-and-comment. 25 1 Despite the taxpayer having been
threatened with penalties and prior negotiations with the IRS falling
apart the court concluded that there was no injury until the penalty was
assessed.
This does not mean procedural claims are never heard. In
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,252 the Court
permitted "standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief
will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that
allegedly harmed the litigant." 25 3 In this case involving the regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, the EPA's failure to act
gave Massachusetts standing because the EPA's refusal presented a risk
to the state of rising sea levels. 2 54 Although refusals to act are given the

246. Id. at 764 (wife did not have protected property interest in police enforcement of restraining
order because seeking an arrest warrant is "an entitlement to nothing but procedure"); see also Ctr.

for Law & Educ. v. Dep't. of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1159-60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (advocacy group
lacked standing to challenge alleged defect in rulemaking committee due to lack of particularized
harm).
247. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
248. Id. at 496-97.
249. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517-18 (2007); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992); Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94-95 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
250. No. 90-3042, 1991 WL 22835 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1991) (per curiam).
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at *2.
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Id. at 518.
Id.
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utmost in deference, the Court nevertheless demanded agency action.
Moreover, in Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida v.
Veneman,25 5 the D.C. Circuit also said that a person "who alleges a
deprivation of a procedural protection to which he is entitled never has
to prove that if he had received the procedure the substantive result
would have been altered."256 In this case, a payment-in-kind program
increased the supply of sugar depressing its price, but the program was
issued without notice-and-comment. Thus, the key is to prove the failure
of procedure affected the resulting guidance and that guidance caused an
injury, not that the lack of procedure was harmful.
The requirement that there be an injury in fact cannot be waived.
These issues are jurisdictional.2 57 Therefore, even if they want to, the
petitioner and government cannot simply assume an injury or that
standing is self-evident. Courts are to raise the issue sua sponte. 258 When
confronted with the issue, the Court held that "the requirement of injury
in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed
by statute."25 9 This may mean that the parties invited to comment on
guidance and otherwise influence policy choices are prevented from
receiving judicial review of the agency's procedures.2 60
Thus, courts have not allowed Congress to circumvent the required
injury in fact, a prerequisite of standing, even though the doctrine is
muddled. 2 6 ' How it will apply in the tax context is unknown. The
general position was established in 1923 when the Supreme Court
denied a taxpayer suit regarding government expenditures on the
grounds that the taxpayer's interest in government revenue, as one of
millions of taxpayers, was too small.262 According to the Court:
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then
every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the
statute here under review, but also in respect of every other
appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the

255. 289 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
256. Id. at 94-95.
257. Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 229, at 963.
258. Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
259. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
U.S. -, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
260. Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 229, at 960.
261. Coplan, supra note 231; Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public, 95 VA. L. REv. 1131
(2009).
262. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (litigating the Maternity Act of 1921,
conditioning federal aid to states on programs to protect maternal health).
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outlay of public money, and whose validity may be
questioned.2 63
The Court worried that judicial review "would operate to disturb the
whole revenue system of the government." 2 6 The IRS's regulatory
behavior may be subject to evaluation and contest but not by an
unlimited number of parties.
In addition to proving an injury in fact, those who question the
Treasury Department's procedures may struggle to satisfy the causation
prong of the standing test. In general, regulated parties, in the tax context
those who owe tax, can more easily demonstrate that the law caused
injury than can the beneficiaries of regulation, in the tax context those
who receive benefits from federal funding. Also, in the tax context,
causation is difficult for taxpayers who are relatively disadvantaged by
not receiving a particular tax preference. The Supreme Court accepts the
difficulty this creates for some plaintiffs, noting the injury is often less
direct but "hinge[s] on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third
party to the government action or inaction."2 65 Although standing is not
precluded in these cases, "it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to
establish."2 66

Through the application of the standing doctrine, courts may deny
third-party standing in tax matters. 2 6 7 In a two-sentence 1976
concurrence, Justice Potter Stewart wrote, "I cannot now imagine a
case ... where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever
could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone
else." 2 68 The D.C. Circuit goes so far to state, "[i]t is well-recognized
that the standing inquiry in tax cases is more restrictive than in other
cases." 269
These limitations mean that direct beneficiaries of programs may not
be able to litigate changes in IRS policy. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
27 0
Welfare Rights Organization,
indigent rights organizations sought to
263. Id.
264. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914); see also Richard B. Stewart, Standingfor
Solidarity, 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1568 (1979).
265. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
266. Id.
267. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systemic Study of a (Misunderstood)Standing
Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 774 (2003).
268. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(excepting the First Amendment).
269. Nat'l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343-44 (2006).
270. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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challenge a revenue ruling, a form of IRS guidance that does not
complete notice-and-comment, that reduced the requirement for taxexempt hospitals to offer emergency care to those unable to pay. 271 The
plaintiffs challenged both the substance of the ruling and the lack of
procedure in its creation. 2 72 Instead of relying on the Anti-Injunction Act
and Declaratory Judgment Act, the Supreme Court dismissed the case
for lack of standing. 273 The Court concluded that the connection between
the ruling and the denial of medical services was too speculative; even if
the rule were changed, there is no reason to know that the plaintiff would
get medical care or even that the hospital would pursue tax-exempt
status.274 In Fulani v. Brady,2 75 when a presidential candidate sought to
invalidate the tax-exempt status of a presidential debate sponsor, the
D.C. Circuit Court took issue with the plaintiff seeking to change the
agency's rule "only as a means to alter the conduct of a third party." 2 76
The combination of standing and the statutory prohibitions often
reduce judicial review through a two-step sieve. If litigation is not
stopped by one, it is stopped by the other. For example, in National
Taxpayers Union v. United States,277 the D.C. Circuit accepted that a
taxpayer organization established standing on behalf of the group's
members to raise an early constitutional challenge against a retroactive
tax rate increase.278 Nevertheless, the court then blocked the litigation
with the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act.
Examining the standing rules as they apply to the review of taxexempt charities' qualifications, Lynn Lu has criticized the inability of
those with interests in tax regulations, but who are not the direct object
of the regulation, to contest them in court.279 Lu provides two examples
of failed challenges on standing grounds: people unable to pay for
medical care challenging the IRS change of requirements for tax-exempt
hospitals and African-American families challenging the tax-exempt
status of de facto segregated private schools.2 80 The goal, at least for Lu,

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
Review
280.

Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 45-46.
935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1330 (emphasis in original).
68 F.3d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1435.
Lynn D. Lu, Standing in the Shadow of Tax Exceptionalism: Expanding Access to Judicial
ofFederalAgency Rules, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 73 (2014).
Id. at 89; E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub
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is to use the judicial process to circumvent the agency and Congress; to
accomplish what they would not do.
Some cases in which judicial review was denied were politically
sensitive and unlikely to elicit a favorable legislative response when the
courts refused to act. For example, in Allen v. Wright,28 1 the Court
denied standing to challenge income tax exemptions for racially
segregated schools.2 82 Although the injury in fact in Allen was the same
as that in Bob Jones and "one of the most serious injuries recognized in
our legal system," the "links in the chain of causation between the
challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too
weak."2 83 The Court would not go so far as to permit litigation to force
the IRS to do what it had voluntarily done in Bob Jones.
Because standing is a constitutional jurisdictional requirement,
exceptions to the standing requirement are narrowly drawn. In Flast v.
Cohen,28 4 the Supreme Court recognized such an exception when it
granted standing to taxpayers who sought to enjoin the use of federal
funds to buy textbooks for parochial schools.2 85 However, Flast was
more of a First Amendment case than a tax case because of its focus on
the separation of church and state. Although Flast indicated that Article
III does not prohibit taxpayer suits, its holding is generally limited to its
facts and may not extend to administrative actions. For example, in Hein
286
v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
the Court declined to grant
standing to challenge the White House's use of federal money to fund
conferences to promote "faith-based initiatives." 287 That it was executive
nom. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vac'd, Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd
sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'dsub nom. Allen v. Wright 468 U.S.
737 (1984). Ignoring that potential claimants to pre-enforcement litigation could be limitless, Lu's
proposal would pressure the definition of particularized, concrete injuries. Nichol, supra note 231,
at 655-56; Sunstein, supra note 231, at 615-17.
281. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 756, 759; Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
284. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
285. Id. Flast held that the Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) limit on taxpayer
standing was only prudential in nature, thus suggesting that there might be standing if authorized by
Congress. See also Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE

W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1042-43 (2009).
286. 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
287. Id. at 602-03 (drawing a distinction between congressional action and executive
discretion); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618-20 (1988); Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982); United States. v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974). In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,
563 U.S. 125, 141-43 (2011), the Court held that Arizona state tax credits did not count as
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action made it beyond the reach of Flast standing. Flast has been the
only Supreme Court case allowing a taxpayer to challenge spending as a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
Thus, standing for the public in tax matters is limited so that in most
cases pre-enforcement litigation is not permitted.288 Similar to the AntiInjunction Act, the "inconvenience and relatively minor expense" of
complying with regulations before filing suit in response to a tax audit is
insufficient to justify earlier judicial review. 289 The tools that the
Treasury Department or IRS use to prevent pre-enforcement litigation in
a particular case, whether statute or common law, may differ, but the
result is often the same.
Additional prudential principles of standing may be waived by
Congress but to date are rarely waived in the tax context.290 Waivable
prudential principles include the prohibition on a litigant raising another
person's legal rights and the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches.
The latter arises frequently in the tax context but is infrequently waived.
Without congressional waiver, courts may refrain from deciding
"abstract questions of wide public significance," which amount to
"generalized grievances" that would be better addressed by Congress.2 91
When the public as a group shares concerns about unfair administration,
courts routinely dismiss the generalized grievance to prevent overuse of
the court system. 292 The issue is more properly congressional than
judicial.

government spending and so could not be challenged under Flast. This argument contravenes most
academic interpretation that urges tax expenditures be equated with direct spending because they
both cost government revenue and accomplish the same objectives, despite the court's claim this is
the spending of the taxpayers' money and not the states'. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Devicefor Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures,

83 HARV. L. REv. 705 (1970); Eric Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending-Does It Make a Difference?, 53
NAT'L TAX J. 361 (2000); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004). But see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni,
Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative Base?: A Critique of the "New
Paradigm"and Its Denouement, 30 VA. TAx REv. 135, 142 (2010).

288. Magill, supranote 261.
289. Stephenson v. Brady, No. 90-3042, 1991 WL 22835, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1991) (per
curiam).

290. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
291. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975); see also United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
292. See id.
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A final justiciability consideration is the ripeness of the issue. The
issue of ripeness is not whether jurisdiction exists but whether the case is
currently ready for adjudication. Ripeness requires the issue be fit for
judicial decision and the parties must experience hardship, namely a
legal wrong, without judicial consideration of the case. Ripeness issues
frequently arise when plaintiffs seek anticipatory relief. In Abbott
29 3
Laboratories v. Gardner,
the Supreme Court held that ripeness's
"basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."294 Despite the
rhetoric, Abbott Laboratories upheld pre-enforcement review of an
administrative regulation.
Abbott Laboratoriesestablished an expansive presumption in favor of
early judicial review of agency action that has since been narrowed.29 5
Nevertheless, ripeness is rarely a high hurdle for procedural challenges
to agency rules unless the court determines that the practical application
of the rule would assist in the judicial evaluation.296 The issue is likely to
turn on whether the challenge is to the rule on its face or whether the
challenge "depends as well on the way in which the [rule] will be
applied."29 7 This may be a higher standard if the rule confers a benefit
than if the rule imposes a burden.298
Much of the difficulty created by the standing and ripeness doctrines
to the ability to make procedural claims against tax guidance would
occur whether or not the claim is raised before or after enforcement. It is
difficult for third parties to prove the required injury occurred. Preenforcement litigation of tax guidance has the additional difficulty of
proving the issue is ripe because it is unknown whether the rule will be
enforced at all. Ripeness will be a particular concern for forms of tax
guidance that are not generally applicable or that purport to forecast
future regulations.

293. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
294. Id. at 148-49.
295. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1180.
296. Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But see Nat'1
Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810-11 (2003); Reno v. Catholic Soc.
Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 57-59 (1993).
297. Cement Kiln, 493 F.3d at 216.
298. Reno, 509 U.S. at 58-59.
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Consequently, despite the APA's preference for pre-enforcement, it is
surprising that any litigation over the procedures used to promulgate tax
guidance is successfully litigated before enforcement. Part of the
difficulty is the complexity of the issues even when divorced from
taxation. Hickman summarizes these doctrinal issues succinctly: "the
law in this area is a mess." 299 These messy prudential requirements
would not be eliminated even if statutory limits were repealed.

III.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION

Although the creation of tax guidance must comply with the APA,
interested parties often find it difficult to challenge the Treasury
3
Department's compliance in courts. " When they can undertake such a
challenge, the challenge is often after the law has been applied to them
so that they are challenging operative guidance. Under this system, some
types of procedural claims can never be made, and people not directly
impacted by tax guidance cannot challenge it, either substantively or
procedurally. There is a cost of these timing and scope limitations. When
courts hear the challenge after the guidance has affected many taxpayers,
there are costs to taxpayers and the tax system. Taxpayer rights and the
consistency of the tax law are jeopardized through the delayed or limited
litigation of procedural complaints.
A.

Courts Belatedly Confront ProceduralClaims

Taxpayers are increasingly bringing cases asking courts to invalidate
regulations and other forms of tax guidance because of the Treasury
Department's or IRS's lack of appropriate procedure, but these cases are
301
These late
generally heard only late in the life of the guidance.
challenges appear from blog reports and academic articles to be
3 02
Courts
increasing in frequency but rarely earlier in their timing.
taxpayer
a
of
process
the
in
late
generally hear these cases only

299. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1200.
300. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d 136, 145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (the Sixth Circuit
pointed out the failure to make procedural claims).
301. The Court has not always focused on procedural issues. For example, in 2003, ignoring the
issue of the APA, in Boeing Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted that even if the
regulations governing cost allocations were interpretive, they would be entitled to deference and,
moreover, they were not arbitrary. 537 U.S. 437 (2003). The Court, instead, jumped into the
substance of the regulation and whether it conformed to the statute.
302. Hickman concluded in 2008, "taxpayers rarely contest Treasury regulations on procedural
grounds." A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1154.
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challenging that taxpayer's personal tax liability. Thus, the guidance is
challenged in response to a taxpayer's audit and failed negotiation with
the agency and long after the guidance has operated on taxpayers. A few
cases have successfully made it before courts earlier in the process, but
early litigation is hard to secure under current law and heavily depends
on the facts of the case to show the tax itself is not being challenged.303
For example, regulations imposing information reporting obligations are
susceptible to procedural challenge whereas a deduction or loss thereof
would not be. This distinction puts pressure on courts that may seek to
grant procedural review but generally can only do so belatedly.
In 2015, the D.C. Circuit summarized the imperfect mesh of case law,
holding that the Anti-Injunction Act: (1) prevents litigation over an
organization's tax status (Bob Jones and "Americans United"), except
for statutorily authorized actions; (2) permits litigation when the plaintiff
has no other means to challenge the result (South Carolina) or the
challenge does not affect tax assessment and collection (Cohen); and (3)
permits litigation if the IRS engages in viewpoint discrimination
(Regan).3 0 Through this relative maze of law, taxpayers seek to overturn
unfavorable regulations before they apply to prevent potential penalties
or the cost of compliance.
Temporary regulations issued by the Treasury Department regarding
inversions illustrate the complexity of the case law challengers face
when bringing early procedural claims. For example, the Chamber of
Commerce filed a lawsuit in Texas seeking to block the temporary
inversion regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department in April
2016.305 Inversions are when a U.S. corporation relocates its legal
domicile outside the U.S. to avoid U.S. taxation on its worldwide
income. Section 7874, the statutory basis of the regulations, disqualifies
inversions for U.S. tax purposes in certain limited circumstances to force
the parent corporation to remain subject to U.S. taxation. 0 6 Congress
enacted the statute in 2004 to target inversions using a merger of a U.S.

303. The issue of the procedure used for the promulgation of tax guidance is often wrapped up in
issues of the proper amount of deference that courts should give to that guidance. The Supreme
Court unanimously extended Chevron deference to tax regulations in 2011 in Mayo Foundationfor
Medical Education & Research v. United States. 562 U.S. 44 (2011). Although claiming a changed
regulatory interpretation originated in the Department's general authority to issue needful rules and
regulations, the Department used notice and comment procedures to do so, a fact noted by the
Court. Thereafter, the Court ruled that the Treasury Department "certainly did not act irrationally"
in its regulations as it upheld their application. Id. at 60.
304. Z Street v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
305. Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16-cv-944 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016).
306. I.R.C. § 7874 (2012).

1364

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1317

corporation into a foreign corporation if the foreign acquirer's
shareholders do not retain a meaningful stake in the new foreign parent
corporation.307 in other words, the U.S. government ignores the
inversion if U.S. shareholders retain a sufficiently large stake in the new
foreign parent corporation.
The regulations extend the definition of disqualified mergers to deny
a tax effect if a U.S. corporation merges into a foreign corporation, but
U.S. shareholders retain a smaller stake in the corporation than defined
in the statute if other facts that make the inversion appear abusive. 30 8
This agency action is not surprising given the political reaction to
American corporations moving offshore; the issue is the means by which
the IRS tries to deter the activity. In the face of congressional opposition
to former President Barack Obama's desire to thwart these inversions,
the regulations create a three-year lookback rule to ensure the foreign
company did not increase in its size to avoid the prior inversion
threshold.309
It is commonly accepted that these new regulations were issued on
April 5, 2016 to block the $152 billion merger of Ireland-based
Allergan, Plc and New York-based Pfizer, Inc. and to dissuade other
companies from attempting similar inversions. 3 10 In the short-term the
strategy was successful. The Pfizer deal was called off, stating that the
decision "was driven by the actions announced by the U.S. Department
of Treasury ... "3 11
As part of its litigation strategy, the Chamber of Commerce argued
that the temporary regulations, issued in conjunction with proposed
regulations, exceed the Treasury Department's statutory authority, are
arbitrary and capricious, and failed to follow notice-and-comment
procedures. In particular, the Chamber complained that the temporary
regulation was issued without prior notice-and-comment and without

307. The statute defines a meaningful stake as sixty percent of the voting and eighty percent of
the value of the new corporation. Id.
308. 26 C.F.R. § 1.7874-8T(g)(6) (2016).
309. Id.
3 10. Laurel Brubaker Calkins, IRS Tax Inversion Rule Change Draws Chamber of Commerce
Suit, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-04/irs-taxinve [https://perma.cc/J39K-XCXM]; Michael J. de la Merced & Leslie Picker, Pfizer and Allergan
Are Said to End Merger as Tax Rules Tighten, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 5, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/H9GChttps://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook/tax-inver?_r--0
LC26].
311. Pfizer Announces Termination of Proposed Combination with Allergan (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-announces-termination-of
proposedcCombinationwith allergan [https://perna.cc/V9HG-KDJ5].
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sufficient explanation for doing so; the Treasury Department's statement
claimed that it had "determined that sections 553(b) and (d) of the
Administrative Procedure Act" did not apply. 312
A difficulty for the Chamber to achieve early review, however, is
proving standing. In particular, as required by Lujan, the Chamber must
prove someone was injured by the regulations. If Pfizer had
consummated its transaction and then been subject to tax, it would have
had the requisite injury in fact.313 But the regulations operate in practice
to prevent challenges by dissuading the activity because the potential
cost is too high. This standing issue increases the difficulty of the case
and is, perhaps, one reason the case was initiated in Texas, a more
taxpayer-friendly jurisdiction than Pfizer's home state of New York.

Moreover, even if standing is satisfied, Daniel Hemel notes this case
is likely to be dismissed because of the Anti-Injunction Act; the parties
must wait until after it has been applied to taxpayers.3 14 The Chamber
seeks the court to set aside a rule that it does not like because the rule
makes it harder for corporations to avoid the inversion limits. The effect
of overturning the rule would be to restrain the IRS from assessing and
collecting tax because more inversions could occur, placing more
revenue outside the reach of the IRS. The purpose of the Anti-Injunction
Act is to prevent litigation such as this that would frustrate the collection
of revenue."' However, the likely result is that even if the regulation is
ultimately declared invalid, no one will risk the penalties from
undertaking a big stakes transaction so the regulation accomplishes its
objective.
Additionally, the proposed regulations attempt to limit earnings
stripping by which American subsidiaries borrow from foreign parent or
affiliated corporations. Challengers to this part of the regulations face
similar difficulties as do those opposing the inversion rules, although it
is more likely businesses will risk penalties to challenge the earnings
stripping rule after their application because the stakes are not as high.

312. T.D. 9761, 81 Fed. Reg. 68, 20882 (Apr. 8, 2016); Fed. Reg. 135734-14 (May 2, 2016).
313. Despite Pfizer's claim, it is unlikely the transaction was sufficiently developed to permit a
claim that Pfizer had an imminent business transaction that fell through as a direct result of the new
tax regulation, which would be a difficult claim with the best facts.
314. Daniel Hemel, The Chamber of Commerce Has an Anti-Injunction Act Problem, MEDrUM
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-chamber-of-commerce-has-ananti-injunction-act-problem-9cc28f6947c#.chl4uwtxe
[https://perma.cc/67XR-V6UU]; see also
&

Challenging the IRS Anti-Inversion Notice: A Hollow Threat, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER

FLOM LLP (Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/challenging-irs-anti-inversion-noticehollow-threat [https://perma.cc/7REJ-LP5H].
315. See supra note 156.
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The issue is that on the payment of interest, an American corporation
may claim a tax deduction, reducing its income in the U.S. even as it
increases income reportable in another country. Traditionally these types
of loans have received favorable U.S. tax treatment but are not reported
on financial statements because they occur within one larger
conglomerate. The regulations seek to target this earnings stripping by
treating related-party debt as stock. The payment of dividends, unlike
interest, is not tax deductible, thereby eliminating the current tax benefit
enjoyed by these loans.3 16
These proposed regulations on earnings stripping have since been
finalized after a significant number of comments were received, and it
remains to be seen if they will be challenged.317 The final regulations
contain a number of changes in response to "detailed and thoughtful
comments."" For example, exceptions were added for several ordinary
business transactions. Additionally, the effective date for a
documentation requirement for interests to be treated as indebtedness
was only for debt instruments issued on or after January 1, 2018,
whereas the other rules are generally effective on or after January 19,
2017. Showing its response to potential procedural litigation, the
Department issued a 380-page preamble to its final regulations to prove
its response to the public's comments.
The earnings stripping issue is controversial and likely to face its own
litigation, in part based on procedure. Although taxpayers may seek preenforcement review, they are unlikely to receive it. For example, the
Business Round Table complained that, when proposed, the regulations
did not comply with the APA's effective date and had an "insufficient
[comment period] given the complexity of the regulations."3 19 The Daily
Tax Report noted that "[r]eams of paper filled with detailed technical
responses to comments won't stop court challenges" to the new rules.320
However, problems with the Anti-Injunction Act remain, and the result
is likely to be delayed litigation, less on the procedure than on the

316. I.R.C. § 163 (2012).
317. T.D. 9790, 81 Fed. Reg. 204.
318. Id. at 72859.
319. Doug Oberhelman et al., Letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary, BUS. ROUND TABLE (July 7,
2016), http://businessroundtable.org/ resources/brt-comment-letter-treasury-department-proposed385-regulations [https://perma.cc/T7R6-L6JE].
320. Erin McManus, Voluminous Preamble Won't Stop Court Challenge to Debt Rules,
BLOOMBERG BNA, DAILY TAX REPORT (Oct. 17, 2016), http://news.bna.com/dtln/display/
batch-print display.adp?searchid=28625713 [https://perma.cc/C9EF-DL3J].
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substance of the regulations.3 2 1 Not mentioning timing, the IRS's
associate chief counsel expects the rules to withstand legal challenge. 322
These potential cases are procedurally harder to hear early than other
recent tax challenges, which have drawn lines around activities for the
"assessment and collection of tax," and therefore sought to evade the
limitations of the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act on
pre-enforcement litigation.3 23 Particularly with the expansion of
reporting obligations, the litigating public seeks a narrow reading of this
clause in the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act to
permit early challenges to reporting regulations. For example, in 2015,
in Direct Marketing Ass 'n v. Brohl,324 the Supreme Court narrowly read
the Tax Injunction Act, a law similar to the Anti-Injunction Act, but one
that prohibits federal district courts from hearing challenges to state
taxes in order to permit challenges to reporting requirements.32 5 In that
case, Colorado law required retailers to notify Colorado customers of
potential use tax liability and required retailers to report tax-related
information to state tax authorities. Thus, the law imposed notice and
reporting obligations but no additional tax.
The Tax Injunction Act is not exactly like the Anti-Injunction Act,
with the Tax Injunction Act adding "restrain" with "enjoin, [and]
suspend," but the Court "assume[d] that words used in both Acts are
generally used in the same way . "326 The "assessment, levy, or
collection" processes referred to in the statute were, according to the
Court, discrete phases of the taxation process that "do not include
informational notices or private reports of information relevant to tax
liability." 327

The

Court

read

"restrain"

as

having

a

"narrow[]

meaning . .. captur[ing] only those orders that stop . . . 'assessment, levy
and collection"' rather than "merely inhibit[] those activities.328
DirectMarketing, if applied to the Anti-Injunction Act, would greatly
expand the number of cases that could be heard pre-enforcement because

321. Hickman suggests the use of temporary regulations coinciding with the proposed
regulations might be a means of challenging the final rules. Id.
322. Kat Lucero, IRS Official: Controversial Treasury Rules Should Survive Legal Challenge,

HILL (Oct. 28, 2016), http://origin-nyi.thehill.com/policy/finance/303325-irs-official-controversialtreasury-rules-should-survive-legal-challenge?amp [https://perma.cc/CBV8-YY2K].
323. See supra notes 151-52.
324.
U.S._, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1132.
1129.
1126.
1132-33.
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information gathering, "includ[ing] private reporting of information used
329
to determine tax liability," was excluded from the Tax Injunction Act.
Although assessment "might also be understood more broadly to
encompass the process by which [the] amount [of tax liability] is
calculated," the Court chose to interpret it as the official action taken
based on information already reported.330 In the Court's reading in
DirectMarketing, collection occurs only "after a formal assessment" and
is part of the enforcement process. In this reading, guidance regarding
anything that occurs prior to a tax return being filed is open to preenforcement litigation.
Direct Marketing is seemingly at odds with another case, discussed in
33 1
the prior Part, Florida Bankers Ass'n v. Department of Treasury.
Florida Bankers is a lower court decision, but it was squarely on the
Anti-Injunction Act. The D.C. Circuit Court held, also in 2015, that a
pre-enforcement suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act despite its
involving banks' reporting obligations of the interest earned by nonresident aliens. In Florida Bankers, the penalty imposed for failing to
comply with the reporting requirements, although not yet imposed, was
sufficient to trigger the statutory bar.33 2 Some scholars take exception to
333
this as inconsistent with the new, narrower reading of these statutes.
Only four years before in Cohen v. United States,334 the D.C. Circuit
had appeared to embrace a more narrow reading of the Anti-Injunction
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act that would permit courts to hear
cases earlier. 335 In Cohen, the taxpayers did not request a refund but
challenged the Notice announcing refund procedures on the basis the
Notice violated the APA. 336 The court denied tax an exception from
procedural APA challenges in refund procedures laid out in Notice
2006-50,331 and, on remand, the district court determined the notice was
binding and therefore invalid because it had not been submitted for

329. Id. at 1129.
330. Id. at 1130.
331. 799 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
332. Id. at 1081.
333. Patrick J. Smith, D.C. Circuit Majority Opinion in Florida Bankers Not Consistent with
Supreme Court's Direct Marketing Decisions, PROCEDURALLY

TAXING

(Aug.

17,

2015),

http://procedurallytaxing.com/d-c-circuit-majority-opinion-in-florida-bankers-not-consistent-withsupreme-courts-direct-marketing-decision-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/QY3E-J6MQ].
334. 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 946 (2015).
335. Id. at 728.
336. Id.
337. Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141.
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notice-and-comment. 33 8 Arguing for administrative law uniformity, the
D.C. Circuit's majority concluded "[t]he IRS is not special in this
regard; no exception exists shielding it-unlike the rest of the Federal
Government-from suit under the APA."339
While Cohen opens up the door to pre-enforcement litigation in the
D.C. Circuit, FloridaBankers seems to close it unless the D.C. Circuit is
deterred by the Direct Market decision. But Cohen had limiting facts
because the court highlighted that its early litigation involved the refund
of taxes already collected as opposed to the assessment and collection of
taxes. Thus, Cohen may signal a tightening of the court's interpretation
of what constitutes tax collection and assessment in the Anti-Injunction
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act. The vacatur was prospective because
more than 100 million taxpayers had obtained refunds.34 0 The IRS
continued to entertain claims filed under the contested procedures until
2012, and the D.C. Circuit held that the IRS did not need to replace the
procedure but that taxpayers should use general refund procedures.3 4 1
Artful description of the assessment and collection of taxes have also
served organizations that previously lacked standing or were unable to
sue on issues not yet ripe, although not yet with respect to the issuance
of tax guidance. In a 2015 case, Z Street v. Koskinen,34 2 a non-profit
organization dedicated to Israeli issues sued the IRS on the grounds that
the IRS undertook more rigorous review of its internal policies than
other non-profits as a result of then President Barack Obama's Middle
East policies.3 43 The District Court concluded this litigation was not to
restrain "the 'assessment or collection' of a tax, but rather to prevent the
IRS from delaying consideration of its application [for tax-exempt
status] ."3" The D.C. Circuit Court agreed that Z Street had no other
remedy, consistent with the South Carolina v. Regan exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act. 345 Although Z Street could wait and pursue
administrative remedies, those remedies only apply to the organization's
qualification for tax-exempt status. Here the issue was the timing of
338. Cohen, 650 F.3d at 721.
339. Id. at 723.
340. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Lit., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138, 144-45
(D.D.C. 2012).
341. In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Lit., 751 F.3d 629, 634 (D.C. Cir.
2014); Announcement 2012-16, 2012-18 I.R.B. 876.
342. Z Street v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 26.
345. Id. at 31.
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consideration, not the result, because of the organization's views on
Israel.
Regardless of the timing of litigation, this newer, narrower approach
to the assessment and collection of taxes language risks opening up
guidance to wide-ranging attacks of courts that strictly impose the APA
on guidance not previously held to this standard. In 2012 in Dominion
Resources Inc. v. United States,34 6 a taxpayer filed suit seeking a refund
of its corporate income taxes. 347 At issue was a long-standing regulation.
A notice of upcoming regulations was published in 1988, a notice of
proposed rulemaking was issued in 1991, and the final regulations were
published in 1994.3 Ignoring the length of time the regulations were
effective, the Federal Circuit invalidated the final regulation, which
governed the capitalization of interest (as opposed to its current
deductibility) on the grounds that the regulation was not a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.3 49 Applying hard look review, the court
concluded that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious because its
promulgation did not have a judicially mandated reasoned explanation of
50
the Treasury Department's decision-making. 3
51
The lower court in Dominion Resources1 had noted the procedural
need for a reasoned explanation but dismissed the concern. The Court of
Federal Claims had found that, while "it is a stretch to conclude" that the
Treasury Department cogently explained its processes, the "'path' that
Treasury was taking in the rulemaking proceedings could be 'discerned,'
albeit somewhat murkily." 352 Examining the evolution of the regulations,
the lower court had concluded that the public had been made aware of
the issue and the Treasury Department had addressed commentators'
suggestions. Therefore, the lower court, until overturned, accepted the
"lack of exactitude and the ensuing confusion" did not "signify that

346. 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
347. Id.; see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Impact ofAgency Procedures and JudicialReview on Tax

Reforms, 65 NAT'L TAX J. 917, 923 (2012).
348. Notice 88-99, 1988-2 C.B. 422; Capitalization of Interest, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,815-01
(proposed Aug. 16, 1991); Capitalization of Interest, 59 Fed. Reg. 67,187 (Dec. 29, 1994).
349. Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B) (1995).
350. Dominion Resources, 681 F.3d at 1319. From the tone of the opinion, it is unlikely any
explanation would have satisfied the majority who disliked a legal fiction on which the regulations
were based, even though the concurrence pointed out some fiction was likely inevitable. Similar
problems existed before, but not often. See Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 267
(Ct. Cl. 1979).
351. 97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2011).
352. Id. at 239, 259.
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Treasury acted to establish the final rule in an arbitrary and capricious
manner." 35 3
The Court of Claims in Balestrav. United States 35 4 may have signaled
it has backtracked from hard look review, although the case did not
focus on the procedure used to promulgate a regulation.355 In Balestra, a
husband and a wife who filed a joint tax return brought a refund suit for
Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) contributions on deferred
retirement compensation that the husband would never receive because
his employer went bankrupt. 6 The taxpayers argued that the regulation
defining the "present value" of an "amount deferred" should have
considered the employer's financial condition.3 57 The court refused to
substitute its own construction of the statute for what it deemed a
reasonable interpretation by the agency.358 Although purporting to apply
State Farm review, the court cursorily repeated the notice of proposed
and final rulemaking. In doing so, the court found the Treasury
Department did not act "arbitrarily or capriciously," but that, instead, it
sought "workable, simple, and flexible" rules. 3 59 The "path" used to
create the regulations was "reasonably discernable." 360
These issues of the application of review and the timing of when the
review is to occur will be particularly important in the Tax Court, which
hears ninety percent of tax cases but traditionally did not focus as much
on administrative law matters as other federal courts. 361 The Tax Court
has recently gone directly to the heart of APA procedure and its
application to tax regulations. The Tax Court has set aside regulations
that had undergone notice-and-comment but did not have an adequate
statement responding to comments after their application to a particular
taxpayer. 3 62 In Altera Corp. v. Commissioner,3 63 decided in 2015, a
353. Id. at 259.
354. 803 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1367-68.
357. Id. at 1369.
358. Id. at 1374.
359. Id. at 1363, 1371.
360. Id. at 1374.
361. I.R.S., DATA BOOK 63 tbl.27 (2015). For an example of the Tax Court's traditional
response to notice and comment, see Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail LLC v. Comm'r, 174 T.C.
211, 245-46 (2010), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Judges Halpern and
Holmes of the Tax Court rejected the traditional interpretation. Id. (Halpern and Holmes, J.J.,
concurring).

362. See, e.g., Altera Corp. v. Comm'r, 145 T.C. 3 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 (9th
Cir. Feb. 23, 2016).
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unanimous Tax Court invalidated certain transfer pricing regulations
issued in 2003.364 Multi-national corporations use transfer pricing to
allocate expenses among their subsidiaries in different countries. In
Altera, the regulations involved the use of stock-based compensation in
cost-sharing arrangements. 36 5 The affiliated group of corporations sought
a redetermination of the deficiencies of the taxes they were found to
owe.3 66 The court ruled on the grounds that the Treasury Department
failed to comply with the APA and granted the taxpayer a partial
summary judgment.367
The taxpayer contested the rule of stock-based compensation in costsharing arrangements, a well-known and hotly debated issue long before
the Altera case. The issue was raised in prior litigation and also in the
368 There were
notice of proposed rulemaking and public hearings.
thirteen submitted comments and four participants in the hearings, but
3 69
these regulations could only be litigated after application.
Nevertheless, at the time the final rule was issued, the Treasury
Department's files did not contain expert opinions, empirical data, or
papers that supported its position, which was opposed by the
comments.3 70 The Treasury Department attempted to address comments
by stating they "do not agree" with them despite acknowledging contrary
"data may not be available."3 71 The Department asserted that the
evidence provided by the commentators "do[es] not share enough
characteristics" with the issues raised by the regulations to be
conclusive.37 2 The court found these were mere assertions by the
agency.373
Applying hard look review, the court found that the Treasury
Department failed to undertake a necessary fact-finding in order to
support its position.3 74 Moreover, the regulation's preamble, while

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
482, 67
369.
370.
371.

145 T.C. 3 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2016).
Id. at 133.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 134.
Xilinix Inc. v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 37 (2005); Compensatory Stock Options Under Section
Fed. Reg. 48,997 (July 29, 2002).
Altera, 145 T.C. at 104.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
T.D. 9088, 2003-2 C.B. at 842-43.

372.
373. Altera, 145 T.C. at 130.
374. Id. at 122-23.
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responding to some comments, was held not to justify the final rule.375

The court appeared frustrated that the Treasury Department did not
consider sufficient variables, and while "improving administrability can
be a reasonable basis for agency action," the Treasury Department did
not make this claim in its preamble (although even if it did, it does not
appear the court would accept this claim without more significant factfinding).37 6 Invalidating the regulations, the Tax Court disagreed with
the Treasury Department that the APA did not apply and found the
Treasury Department failed to engage in reasoned decision-making by
not producing this evidence and not responding to several comments. As
a result, the Treasury Department was found to have engaged in arbitrary
and capricious decision-making.3 77
This is a change in tenor but not in timing from earlier Tax Court
decisions. For example, in 1998, in Schwalbach v. Commissioner,378
when challenging taxes determined to be owed, the taxpayer argued that
the passive activity loss regulations did not comply with the APA and so
the amount of taxes the IRS claimed were owed should be reduced, and
the Tax Court held the regulations did.379 In its discussion, the court
focused on the interaction between the agency and the public in two
rounds of comments rather than evaluating the wording of notices and
comments.3 80 In Schwalbach, the proposed regulations had not reached
shareholders of C corporations, but this relationship was governed by the
final regulations. 38 1 The court concluded that, even though this provision
was not in the proposed regulation, the absence did not invalidate the
notice-and-comment process, a position inconsistent with modern hard
look review.382
With the evolution to greater receptiveness to APA procedural
challenges, taxpayers recognize this change as a means of changing tax
outcomes once they have been subject to audit. In other words, savvy
taxpayers understand that challenging procedures is now a tool when a
taxpayer is confronted with an audit and tax deficiency. To this end, a
375. Id. at 118.
376. Id. at 126.
377. Id. at 134.
378. 111 T.C. 215 (1998).
379. Id.; see also Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989); Griffin Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. C1. 183 (1992); Dow Coming Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 184
(1990); Wing v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 17 (1983).
380. Schwalbach, 111 T.C. at 230.
381. Id. at 220.
382. Id. at 216.
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partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP wrote that "the impact of
[Altera] and its limits on the IRS's rulemaking authority could also be
felt more broadly.. . ."3 He notes, perhaps with glee, that regulations
384
are binding on the IRS even as taxpayers are free to challenge them.
In its own "Tax Controversy Alert," a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP
noted that the arbitrary and capricious requirement "is not a toothless
throwaway requirement but rather a real and potentially potent method
38 5
And a Florida State law
of challenging Treasury regulations."
professor told the Florida Bar that a "warrior who does not use all
weapons risks unnecessary defeat" when "encourag[ing] taxpayers'
38
In 2016, NYU Law School hosted
counsel" to make APA challenges.
a program on using the APA to challenge IRS guidance and, in 2014,
Duke Law School held a symposium on applying administrative law in
tax.38 7 These issues are not going away. If anything, the need to resolve
procedural issues will grow.
B.

Sometimes Courts Never Review ProceduralViolations

Despite the likelihood that courts will hear more procedural cases,
existing statutory and prudential limitations mean that some procedural
claims can never successfully be presented. As a result, some claims that
a piece of tax guidance was not created using proper procedures are
never heard by a court, whether before or after enforcement. This Article
focuses on two types of guidance that are unlikely to be litigated to
illustrate these concerns: first, guidance that favors a select group of
taxpayers, due to issues involving standing; and, second, tax notices that

383. Roger Jones et al., McDermott Will & Emery LLP, How to Challenge Tax Regs on
Administrative Law Grounds, NAT'L L. REv. (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/altera-how-to-challenge-tax-regulations-administrative-law-grounds [https://perma.cc/H4TRSDMR].
384. Id.
385. J. Walker Johnson et al., STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, Tax Controversy Alert, Using the
Administrative Procedure Act to Challenge Claims that IRS Regulations Are Entitled to Chevron
Deference (2012), http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/4472.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWU3WG3N].
386. Steve Johnson, Using Administrative Law to Challenge IRS Determinations, 88 FLA. B.J.
81(2014).
387. Using the Administrative Procedure Act to Challenge IRS Guidance, N.Y.U. LAW TAX
BLOG (Feb. 1, 2016), http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/taxblog/2016/02/using-the-administrative-procedureact-to-challenge-irs-guidance [https://perma.cc/CWY3-LHPTI; Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and
Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, DUKE L.J., http://dlj.law.duke.edu/currentissue/ [https://perma.cc/H82M-V28W].
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promise future regulations, due to lack of finality. In both instances,
procedural claims are not reviewable.
Looking at the first instance, guidance that favors isolated groups of
taxpayers is one example of how some procedural issues are unlikely to
be addressed even if the agency used an undemocratic process in
creating the guidance. When the government narrowly tailors tax
reduction for political or administrative reasons, those benefited are
unlikely to object to the resulting benefit. Even if they wanted to, they
may be unable to make procedural objections to the way the reduction
was formulated. For rules that create favorable tax treatment, such as an
exclusion from tax, there is no enforcement per se, and there is generally
no injury from the favorable rule. Thus, those that benefit from the rule
but oppose the procedure are unable to challenge it in court.
Third party suits to tailored tax benefits are also unlikely. Although
the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act are unlikely to
apply as tax preferences are not to raise revenue, as discussed in the
prior Part," Flast has set a high bar for establishing standing in tax
cases.389 Issues of favoritism are generally deemed political matters.
Except in extreme circumstances such as in Flast involving First
Amendment rights, these issues are subject only to congressional review.
Treasury Department and IRS favoritism in the enforcement of a
congressional statute might warrant an exception, but one not yet
created.
These issues of tax favoritism arise more often than one might think.
For example, the IRS makes numerous preferential interpretations of the
Internal Revenue Code, often as a result of concern for the
administrability of a particular issue, that benefit select groups of
taxpayers. Lawrence Zelenak refers to these as customary deviations
from what is required by the Code."' According to Zelenak, these
deviations are different from dubious readings of the statutory language
or from positions contrary to the literal language of the Code but that are
almost certainly required by courts, such as not taxing imputed
income. 39 ' Additionally, they are different from simple underenforcement without any public indication of that approach, such as the
IRS not seeking actual tip amounts in excess of eight percent of
restaurant sales. 39 2
388. See section I.B.
389. See supra notes 275-68.
390. Zelenak, supra note 23.

391. Id. at 833-34.
392. Id. at 834-35.
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Consider, for example, the issue of frequent flyer miles. The IRS
announced that, although technically within the meaning of gross
income in section 61 of the Code, it would not seek to tax frequent flyer
miles received for business travel.3 93 Because a tax is not being applied
so that no one is taxed as a result of the rule, there is no enforcement to
trigger a lawsuit. There is no injury in fact for standing. Without the
lawsuit, the policy of not taxing this fringe benefit cannot be judicially
challenged. Although this exclusion remains the law, at least one
exception has been carved out when frequent flyer miles are received for
opening a bank account, although the rule was instigated more by
Citibank's issuance of a Form 1099-MISC than the IRS. The inclusion
of income was quickly challenged.394
As another example, the IRS narrowed statutory limits on the
deductibility of corporate net operating losses and unrealized built-in
losses following a corporate acquisition.3 95 The rules are complicated but
aim to prevent taxpayers from deducting losses after mergers planned to
traffic in tax deductions. Notice 2008-83 declared that the limits of this
section would not apply to banks.396 The new rule single-handedly
permitted mergers between banks to maintain certain loss deductions
and did so at odds with express statutory prohibitions. The notice was
issued at the beginning of the Great Recession and immediately prior to
the bailout of the financial industry. 397 This notice facilitated the
acquisition of Wachovia, a failing bank, by Wells Fargo, one that
survived the Recession. 3 9 8
The favorable impact of Notice 2008-83 on the targeted taxpayers
was not challengeable in courts. No one had standing to challenge the
liberalization of the rules that allowed Wells Fargo to buy Wachovia's
tax deductions. Political fallout nevertheless occurred. Numerous people
393. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621, discussed in Zelenak, supra note 23, at 83132.
394. Shankar v. Comm'r, 143 T.C. 140 (2014); see also Kelly Phillips Erb, Tax Court Sides with
IRS in Tax Treatment of FrequentFlyer Miles Issued by Citibank, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014, 8:35
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/08/28/tax-court-sides-with-irs-in-taxAM),
treatment-of-frequent-flyer-miles-issued-by-citibank/ [https://perma.cc/529D-7F3N].
395. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905, discussed in Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards: Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 64 Duke L.J.

ONLINE 53, 88-92 (2015); Zelenak, supra note 23, at 847.
396. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905.
397. Id.
398. Memorandum from Rich Delmar, Counsel to the Inspector Gen., to Eric Thorson, Inspector
Gen., on Inquiry Regarding IRS Notice 2008-83 (Sept. 3, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/
0
about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/Inquiry /o20Regarding%20IRS%20Notice%20200883.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EKQ-S5N2].
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critiqued the notice.3 99 It was a significant enough issue that Congress
responded by enacting legislation that disapproved of Notice 2008-83 as
"inconsistent with the congressional intent" of section 382 and
describing the IRS's authority for the notice as "doubtful." 4 00 Congress
focused on concerns of the separation of powers rather than narrow
procedural matters. Also, undermining this strong rhetorical position
explicitly stating that the agency had no authority to issue the guidance,
Congress acknowledged that taxpayers need to be able to rely on IRS
guidance. Congress permitted taxpayers to rely on the notice for
ownership changes that occurred before January 17, 2009, the date the
legislation was enacted. 40 1 Not to be deterred, in 2010, the IRS issued
Notice 2010-2, declaring that section 382 would not apply if the
Treasury Department were to sell its shares, presumably of General
Motors, to the public.40 2 It has not been overturned.4 03
Favorable agency action, such as with respect to frequent flyer miles
or net operating losses, published through the issuance of notices that do
not receive public feedback in a notice-and-comment process are
particularly troubling. The agency is creating law, which may be a valid
use of its delegated authority under section 7805. However, in doing so
the agency should take the requisite steps to write that law in the process
designed for such activity by Congress. In other words, to maintain our
democratic system, when the public does not participate through
Congress in the making of exceptions to the tax law, the public should
be able to participate through notice-and-comment in order to maintain
agency accountability to the people.
It is difficult to fix this problem of lack of accountability for tax
favoritism. Arguably litigation over favorable rules is not prohibited by
the Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act because these
exceptions reduce, rather than increase, tax revenue. However, because

399. Nathaniel Cushman, Comment, The Impact of Illegal Tax Guidance: Notice 2008-83, 62
TAX LAW. 867 (2009); Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for US. Banks, WASH. POST (Nov. 10,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/11/09/AR2008110902155.html
[https://perma.cc/Q6JE-ZTAS]
(citing
interviews with a dozen tax lawyers); Tax Policy: Treasury Should Have Consulted Congress
Before Giving Banks Breaks, Grassley Says, BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY TAx REP., Oct. 14, 2008, at
G- 1.
400. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261(a), 123 Stat.
115, 342-43.
401. Id.
402. Notice 2010-2, 2010-1 C.B. 251.
403. Senate Bill 2916 would have nullified Notice 2010-2; however, it died in committee. S.B.
2916 111th Cong., Reg. Sess. (2009).
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these notices favor the taxpayer at whom they are aimed, no one is in a
position to challenge them in court other than as a third-party claim.404
Moreover, because they are favorable to the taxpayer, they must be
challenged before enforcement, or the challenge has little effect.
Challenges occurring after their effective date would likely be after those
benefited submitted tax returns, so that remedies would likely only be
prospective. 405 Although this would be better than the current system,
even better solutions should be found.
A second group of tax guidance for which procedural claims are
unlikely to be heard is guidance that operates against taxpayers, but the
guidance is not, strictly speaking, a final rule forcing taxpayer action.
For example, some IRS Notices, which are arguably not final rules so
not subject to challenge, alert taxpayers to potential enforcement activity
and are intended to influence taxpayer behavior.406 If determined to be
final, the guidance would increase a taxpayer's tax obligation and thus
raise Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act limits to preenforcement litigation. However, if found to be a final rule, the
prohibition on litigation becomes a timing issue. Procedural claims could
be raised after enforcement. If the IRS uses the notice as part of its
justification for the tax assessment, courts could hear procedural claims
against the specific guidance because the guidance is used to cause the
harm of the tax assessment. An issue remains whether the notice is final
because its application appears final, even if a notice does not purport to
be.
For example, the IRS not infrequently issues notices warning of
potential action, such as "to relate what regulations will say in situations
where the regulations may not be published in the immediate future." 407
Returning to the issue of the inversion regulations, before the final
regulations were issued in 2016, the IRS issued Notice 2014-52 on
September 22, 2014, and amended the notice with Notice 2015-79 on
November 19, 2015.408 The notices contained rules in the form of
regulations but only announced that the Treasury Department "intends to
404. Taxpayer advocates or tax clinics are natural advocates over these issues.
405. There are good reasons that taxpayers filing tax returns should be able to rely on
government guidance outstanding at the date of filing and, practically, these taxpayers' statute of
limitations is likely to have lapsed before litigation over procedure is complete.
406. This attempt to influence may be particularly troubling because of the tax system's stated
reliance on voluntary compliance.
407. Understanding IRS Guidance - A Brief Primer, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https://perma.cc/R2ZE-E45S].
408. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, modified by Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775; see
also T.D. 9761, 81 Fed. Reg. 20858 (Apr. 8, 2016).
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issue" regulations to reduce the benefit of inversion transactions and
requested public comments. Thus, the language was a basis for
regulations but failed to be published to initiate formal notice-andcomment.
These notices were expressly intended to provide awareness of the
issue and potential future actions of the IRS; however, it is hard to
believe they were not also intended to stop these types of transactions.
The notices also limited companies' ability to claim certain tax benefits
if they undertake inversions after the notice was released. This raises
companies' risk of challenging the rules at the same time that it
minimizes chances of procedural challenges. With this method of
announcing proposed regulations without following the prescribed
publication, the agency failed to meet the requirements for beginning
notice-and-comment. Nevertheless, the notices' Fact Sheet announced
the proposal as having full force of law and the regulations were
expected to apply to transactions completed on or after the publication of
the notices.409
As another example, the IRS issues notices putting transactions on a
list of transactions that impose reporting and penalty burdens. Although
classification as a listed transaction does not impose a tax itself, its
burdens are intended to affect taxpayer behavior. As a listed transaction,
taxpayers who have entered into these types of transactions are required
to disclose those transactions and their advisors may be subject to
registration and required to maintain lists. 4 10

'

One of the many listed transactions was designated as such in 2015
when the IRS issued notices on certain contracts it viewed as abusive.4 1
The IRS designated certain "basket option contracts" as listed
transactions and other "basket contracts" as transactions of interest. The
IRS was concerned that these contracts have the potential for tax
avoidance because they may result in the improper deferral of income or
improper categorization of income as long-term capital gain. In
particular, the IRS focused on contracts that do not hold static assets, so
that the referenced property changes over time, and in which the
taxpayer or designee has some amount of control over the components
of the underlying contract. Although the IRS admitted not having
409. Fact Sheet: Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2645.aspx
[https://perma.cc/H6JM-2J8Z].
410. I.R.C. §§ 1.6011-4, 6111, 6112 (2012).
411. Notice 2015-73, 2015-46 I.R.B. 660, Notice 2015-74, 2015-46 I.R.B. 663, revoking Notice
2015-47, 2015-30 I.R.B. 76, Notice 2015-48, 2015-30 I.R.B. 77.
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sufficient information about basket contracts to determine whether they
should be identified as tax avoidance transactions, the IRS required they
be disclosed and the IRS retained discretion to remove these transactions
from the list after more information is gathered.
These notices were not unexpected. The IRS issued a legal advice
memorandum in 2010 challenging the contracts' characterization as
options for tax purposes and the Senate has critiqued their use.412
However, within months of issuing the notices the IRS had issued new
notices, revoking the old ones. The new notices provided greater detail
and discussion of the types of transactions to be covered but created a
trail of law that is harder to follow than would have been necessary if all
of the information had been in the first issuance. And that trail was
created without formal public input.
Following a contract's designation as a listed transaction, if the IRS
chooses to enforce failure to comply with the listed transaction rules,
then the punishment would open the door to a procedural challenge.4 13
However, penalties are not the only goal of designating activities as
listed transactions. As the law firm Mayer Brown notes,
Historically, the IRS has used the reportable transaction
disclosure regime not only as a warning to taxpayers . . . who are
considering engaging in the transactions, but also as a means to
collect preliminary information to aid in the future examination
of taxpayers that have already implemented the structures.414
To the extent the IRS accomplishes its objective without imposing the
penalty, the notice is not reviewable.
Despite the existence of this information-gathering objective,
taxpayers are unlikely to be able to challenge the procedure behind the
4 15
creation of these rules until the IRS enforces them against a taxpayer.
The Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act almost certainly
will be held to prohibit review because the rules are closely tied to the
412. Office of Chief Counsel, IRM, to Area Counsel, Hedge Fund Basket Option Contracts,
A.M. 2010-005, Oct. 15, 2010; Senate, Permanent Subcomm. on Invest., Abuse of Structured
FinancialProducts, at 6-8 (July 22, 2014).
413. I.R.C. § 6707A (2012).
414. Out-of-the-Money: The IRS Designates Basket Options as Listed Transactions and

Transactions of Interest, MAYER BROWN (July 24, 2015), https://m.mayerbrown.com/files/
Publication/4f8936ef-7748-4fdd-9ce4-1160ee83be65/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
20ea76ae-2f3d-442c-afcc-2351b96b8687/150716-UPDATE-CHI-Tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/35AL97T2].
415. This concern was also noticed by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. Challenging
the IRS Anti-Inversion Notice: A Hollow Threat (Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/
challenging-irs-anti-inversion-notice-hollow-threat [https://perma.cc/ZB74-84LK].
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"assessment and collection" of federal revenue. Moreover, even with a
claim that the notices violate the APA, it is unlikely a court would find
this type of notice "a final agency action" under section 704 as is
necessary to give rise to APA review.
What is more troubling is the extent to which guidance may alert
taxpayers of future changes in regulations and, therefore, change
behavior but may not be used for enforcement. For example, the IRS
sometimes issues notices warning of future regulations that may or may
not ever be issued. To the extent taxpayers voluntarily comply with the
notice, if only because of the threat that future regulations will be
retroactive back to the notice, it has changed behavior in the same way
as would an enforceable rule. However, the notice is arguably not
subject to review. With a significant exercise of government power, a
practical but not justiciable injury is caused.
Similar problems of changing taxpayer behavior without the public's
input in the formation of the rule exist with the issuance of temporary
regulations. Temporary regulations often have effective dates as of their
issuance although proposed regulations are simultaneously proceeding
through notice-and-comment. These temporary regulations are only
somewhat more likely to be reviewed by courts than are notices. Kristin
Hickman notes how temporary regulations are unlikely to face
successful challenge because they will be turned into permanent
regulations before litigation is complete.416 Litigation is often slow, but
the process of taking regulations from temporary to final "usually takes
about a year." 4 17
The procedural problem could render the succeeding regulations
invalid, but that is not always the case. 41 8 For many courts, whether to
overturn the final regulations depends upon whether the agency kept an
"open mind" when considering comments or demonstrated its
responsiveness to the public.4 19 Michael Asimow, for one, criticizes the
invalidation of a rule that completes notice-and-comment just because a
prior one failed to do so. 42 0 Nevertheless, without some consequence to
416. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1190-91.
417. Id.
418. Fed. Express Corp. v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 112, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Mortg. Inv'rs Corp. of
Ohio v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683
F.2d 752, 767-68 (3d Cir. 1982).
419. Gober, 220 F.3d at 1379; Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin.,
28 F.3d 1288, 1292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 188 (1st Cir. 1983).
420. Asimow, supra note 74, at 725-27. Although forms of guidance other than regulations are
often issued by the IRS, they do not go through notice and comment on the grounds they are
interpretive, and it is questionable whether they would survive a challenge under the APA. Rulings
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using temporary regulations, the agency is likely to continue changing
public behavior before the public has the opportunity to comment.
The issue of using notices to affect taxpaying behavior may better be
left to Congress than the courts. In particular when the notices extend tax
preferences rather than threaten penalties, the ability may be the heart of
agency discretion, especially when the alternative is difficult to
administer. Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein argue that the Treasury
Department has a long-standing policy of not enforcing the gross income
provision of the Code to its fullest as a matter of agency discretion.421
Arguing that this approach is the response of conscientious
administrators to practical problems, these authors would likely
(although it is unknown for certain) not want to turn this administrative
power over to courts who may be less concerned with issues of
valuation, liquidity, enforceability, and public understanding. Through
its exercise of discretion in the form of notices, the agency can address
concerns quickly and efficiently.
The underlying problem, at least for this Article, is not the subject
matter of these rules but that the IRS's method of extending these
benefits and these burdens does not provide the public an opportunity to
comment. Because these rules do not originate in Congress, there is no
democratic oversight in the traditional sense. Even when Congress
becomes engaged in an issue, as it did with net operating losses, the
legislative fix is generally to substantive matters rather than procedural
concerns. As a result, tax law is being created behind closed doors. To
make matters worse, under the current legislative and prudential
restrictions on tax litigation, the process is unlikely to be subject to
judicial review.
C.

Specific Problems with Denying Early Review

The timing for when courts review procedural claims over tax
guidance is problematic. This Part explores some of the problems caused
by this litigation occurring after enforcement but does not seek to cover
them all. The problems range from those imposed on individual
taxpayers, who may or may not owe more in tax, to those imposed on
society as a whole. The tax system loses consistency as its guidance is

have less weight than regulations but, according to the IRS, "may be used as precedents" by both
taxpayers and the IRS. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814; I.R.M.
§ 32.2.2.10.
421. I.R.C. § 61 (2012); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA.
TAx REv. 295 (2011).
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challenged and possibly overturned, and faith in the tax system may be
compromised. Pre-enforcement litigation of procedure would not fix all
of these problems but would mitigate many of their costs.
The problems created by procedural deficiencies in the tax context are
not new and have already received significant attention by the academic
community. Michael Asimow claimed in 1991 that the Treasury
Department's procedures "leave[] in doubt the validity of numerous
temporary and final regulations . .."422 Kristin Hickman has written
about ten articles, many of which are quoted herein, on the issue of
Treasury Department and IRS compliance with the APA. With respect to
the issuance of binding temporary regulations with the simultaneous
issuance of proposed regulations for notice-and-comment, Juan Vasquez
and Peter Lowy described this as "obliterat[ing] the APA's notice-andcomment procedures."4 23 John Coverdale questioned "what justification
the Treasury believes it has for not using notice and comment .... "424
Juan Lavilla called the Department's actions "particularly remarkable"
when compared with other agencies. 425
Although there is pushback to the wholesale importation of the APA
into taxation, the perception of agency abuse alone should be sufficient
to demand action.4 26 However, delaying litigation over procedural
matters until after enforcement, as required by the statutory prohibitions
and common law, makes it less likely that these claims will be brought,
thereby strengthening critics' claims. Even though the agency created
neither cause of the deferral-the statutory or prudential limitations-it
is often blamed for the lateness of the litigation.4 27
A chief problem with the timing of litigation is that it necessarily
limits who can bring suit. Only those taxpayers found in violation of the
tax guidance and who do not settle their tax liability are able to
challenge the procedures behind the creation of the guidance. To reach a
stage that permits this litigation first requires exhausting administrative

422. Asimow, supra note 73, at 369-70.
423. Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary Treasury Regulations: An
Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and

Invalidity, 3 HOuS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 248, 253 (2003); see also Hickman, A Problem of Remedy,
supra note 8, at 1160.
424. John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations

and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 39, 69 (2003).
425. Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking
Requirements Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 341 (1989).
426. See supra note 8.

427. Id.
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avenues to redress the substantive tax issues. 4 28 Following audit and a
determination of deficiency, the taxpayer must challenge the result in the
IRS's Appeals Office before being able to proceed to court.4 29 To choose
litigation to permit a court to hear procedural claims, the taxpayer would
forego the option of settlement in either audit or on administrative
appeal. If the taxpayer raised and won the issue in settlement,
settlements are confidential, as are tax returns.4 30 Thus, with both
administrative resolution and settlement, the matter is closed without
establishing precedent.
The structure of litigation also means that those who do not owe tax
have very few options for challenging guidance's procedures, and not
owing tax may result from the IRS's failure to audit for particular
issues. 43 1 Instead, taxpayers who may be willing to challenge the
procedures behind the creation of rules must wait until they are, if ever,
assessed penalties. If the IRS does not audit the issue, the procedural
claim may never be litigated. With the audit rate currently less than one
percent, although higher for certain categories of taxpayers, it is likely
many issues that could provoke challenge are not given an opportunity
for review.4 32 Consequently, assuming compliance imposes some cost on
complying taxpayers, those who comply will be at a disadvantage
compared to those who do not.
In addition, the delay in litigation reduces the value of successful
claims. What most taxpayers may gain in litigation is unlikely to offset
the expense of the litigation itself. For example, because of the limited
benefit of potential remedies the court could impose, Kristin Hickman
points out that taxpayers might feel that challenging temporary
regulations "is a futile act not worth the effort." 433 Because taxpayers
cannot use class actions in tax litigation over tax liability because of the
428. Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 1999); Brennan v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
134 F.3d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1998); Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1997).
429. First, if the taxpayer does not pay the liability determined to be owed the taxpayer can
pursue deficiency litigation in the Tax Court. I.R.C. §§ 6211(a), 6212(a), 6213(a) (2012).
Alternatively, a taxpayer can pay the tax the IRS determines is owed and seek a refund. This
subjects the taxpayer "to an equivalent to an audit" as the case proceeds in the appropriate District

Court or the Court of Claims. I.R.C. § 7422(a); Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at
1184-85.
430. I.R.C. § 6103(a). For more on the play of confidentiality, see Hickman, A Problem of
Remedy, supranote 8, at 1185-87.
431. Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2006).
432. SOI Stats-Examination Coverage-Individual Income Tax Returns Examined, I.R.S.

(2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-examination-coverage-individual-income-tax-returnsexamined-irs-data-book-table-9b [https://perma.cc/VP25-7EAX].
433. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1193, 1206.
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individualized results post-assessment, even if the issue has a small
impact on many taxpayers, spreading the cost of tax suits is difficult.4 34
Thus, there might be little incentive to fight how guidance is made.
Disincentives are increased because, unlike in other areas of law that
permit pre-enforcement litigation, people are not suing in postenforcement tax litigation simply to perfect the agency's procedures.
Instead, they are suing over their own tax obligations. The personal
nature of the result and that the costs are already imposed likely changes
the way people perceive the litigation. With pre-enforcement litigation, a
judge remanding a case to the agency to correct the procedures would be
a victory. In a tax refund or deficiency case, remand is insufficient to
accomplish the goal of reducing the taxes owed. If courts are likely to
remand procedural matters without vacating the rule, the taxpayer has
little incentive to challenge the rules because the personal outcome
remains the same.
These limits on litigation reduce the voices that are heard in matters
of tax procedure and the substance of the rules themselves. Eliminating a
check to ensure compliance with notice-and-comment potentially loses
the voices of lower-income and less well-connected individuals because
these groups are unlikely to have other routes to influence the Treasury
Department.43 5 There is no guarantee these groups would claim the
opportunity to engage in procedural litigation or to participate in noticeand-comment; however, any future absence is no reason to foreclose the
possibility. It may speak to a need to permit organizations to litigate and
advocate on these groups' behalf. Organizations exist to help taxpayers
with the tax filing and audit processes, and they may bring procedural
claims in the process of enforcement. Although currently foreclosed
from doing so, these organizations should be empowered to engage in
pre-enforcement litigation and the submission of comments that would
aid their constituents prospectively.4 36

434. Norton, supra note 169 at 624. Taxpayers may seek representative suits, but even if the IRS
loses, the IRS may not acquiesce to the judgment. Unless the Supreme Court decides an issue, the
IRS is free to continue fighting. Id. It is possible to have class action lawsuits over other regulatory
matters; for example, there is a class action suit regarding preparer tax identification numbers. See
Alistair M. Nevius, PTIN Class Action Lawsuit Affects All Tax Return Preparers,J. ACCOUNTANCY
(Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.joumalofaccountancy.com/news/2016/oct/ptin-class-action-lawsuit201615343.html [https://perma.cc/7Q8Q-VJKP].
435. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 411,
414, 460-61 (2005); Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1205-06.
436. Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing
Participation,12 FLA. TAx REV. 517, 554 (2012).
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Until someone is willing and able to litigate procedural issues, people
are forced to operate under rules that might have procedural
imperfections that would nullify the rule. This means that during the life
of the guidance, taxpayers must evaluate the law's substance plus its
procedural history as they plan their tax lives. This is an undue burden
on taxpayers and, as Richard Pierce warns, the lack of pre-enforcement
review may "induce regulatees to comply with a rule, even if they
believe the rule to be invalid, rather than to take the risks attendant to
noncompliance and a subsequent challenge to the validity of the rule in
an enforcement case." 437 Taxpayers must evaluate procedure despite
courts not applying consistent standards in their evaluation, making it
more difficult for non-experts to do so, especially without the judiciary
acting as referee.
The evaluation process is complicated by the possibility that a court
will apply Chevron deference if the court gets past procedural concerns.
With Chevron deference, courts defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes.438 Therefore, if a taxpayer
misjudges a procedural issue, the taxpayer faces the prospect of the court
deferring to the rule even if it is not the best interpretation of the statute.
However, notwithstanding its broad language, Chevron is not
consistently applied.439 Courts do not clearly or consistently apply any of
the deference standards, and scholars debate the effect deference has on
the outcome of cases.440
In particular with respect to tax cases, Chevron deference has not
always resulted in victory for the government. Although courts defer to
the Treasury Department regarding tax matters more than most other
agencies receive deference for other issues, courts do not defer nearly as
437. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59,
90 (1995); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An
Evaluation ofProposalsto Restrict Pre-EnforcementReview ofAgency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85,

100-01 (1997).
438. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
439. Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 2081 (2005); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1443
(2005); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1271 (2008); Mark Seidenfeld,
Chevron'sFoundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273 (2011).

440. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 6; Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D.
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Democratizingthe Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 568-69 (2006);

Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens Do?,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1898-99 (2006); Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era ofAdministrative
Law: An EmpiricalStudy of the Supreme Court's Retreatfrom Chevron Principles in United States

v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REv. 289, 325-28 (2002); Zaring, supra note 135 at 170-76.
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often to the IRS." Even for the Treasury Department, deference is far
from guaranteed. For example, in 2012, in United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC,44 2 the Supreme Court reviewed final
regulations extending the statute of limitations in a way that applied to a
well-known abusive tax shelter." 3 Based on judicial precedent, the Court
found there was no statutory ambiguity and therefore no need to defer to
the Treasury Department."4 Congress has since changed the statute to
overturn Home Concrete.44 5
Similarly, in 2014, in King v. Burwell,4 6 the Supreme Court refused
to defer to Treasury Department regulations interpreting provisions of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act." 7 Despite finding the
language ambiguous, the first step of Chevron, the Court then interpreted
the provision in a manner "that is compatible with the rest of the law.""
Sidestepping Chevron, the Court created its own operational rules on the
grounds that, if Congress wanted to assign such power over the new
healthcare system to the agency, Congress "surely would have done so
expressly." 4 49
Therefore, taxpayers face uncertain outcomes and a level of judicial
deference for challenging what they believe are inadequate procedures.
They risk financial penalties to do so; however, to receive statutory
penalties, taxpayers' arguments would need to be very weak. The IRS
may impose penalties if a taxpayer fails to follow guidance, even for
guidance that the Treasury Department claims is interpretive and not
subject to notice-and-comment. 45 0 However, the application of penalties
depends upon the type of guidance and the taxpayer's reasons for failing
to follow them. In other words, a reasonable argument for failing to
follow the regulation will not incur penalties. In addition to potential
penalties, interest accrues during periods of dispute over the procedures
441. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MIcH. L. REV.

(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 48-49, 51).
442. _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), superseded by statute, Surface Transportation and
Veterans Healthcare Choice Improvement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-41, § 2005, 129 Stat. 443,
456-57 (2015).
443. Id. at 1839.
444. Id. at 1844.
445. § 2005, 129 Stat. 443, 456-57.
446. _ U.S. _ 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
447. Id. at 2489.
448. Id. at 2492 (quoting United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
449. Id. at 2489.
450. I.R.C. § 6662 (2012).
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(as well as substantive disagreements), payable only if the taxpayer loses
the challenge. Although interest and penalties may toll at various times
in the assessment process and during collection proceedings, they
generally accrue during administrative challenge.4 51
If taxpayers are willing to face these ambiguities and costs, under
current law there is a time limit on how long they can make procedural
challenges, if only the government remembers to raise the statute of
limitations. In general, procedural challenges are limited by the six-year
general federal statute of limitations unless a statutory grant prescribes a
different time frame.452 Underlying this limitation is "a concern for the
agency's interest in prompt review and the public's settled expectations
regarding agency action."4 53 Courts have also held that failure to engage
in notice-and-comment does not represent a continuing violation of the
APA.454 This statute of limitations is often held not to be jurisdictional,
and some courts have pointed out that the government often fails to
make the claim.455
Despite the statute of limitations, there remain loopholes within the
statute of limitations that would permit the invalidation of regulations on
procedural grounds at any time. For example, the general federal statute
of limitations is extended for three years after a potential litigant is no
longer "beyond the seas" or under "legal disability."456 There is also the
issue of when the period starts. For procedural matters, the statute of
limitations begins when the rule becomes final; for substantive matters,
timing is based on when the agency applies the rule to the challenger.45 7
However, in addition, for many rules, the statute of limitations applies
after applying the doctrines of finality, ripeness, and exhaustion, which
may be long after publication.4 58 In Hudson v. Federal Aviation
Administration,459 the court held that a statutory sixty-day statute of
limitations did not limit challenges to a notice because the notice was not
ripe until it was applied in order to allow courts a better opportunity to

451. Id. § 6601(a), (b)(5).
452. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012).
453. Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 2006).
454. Preminger v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
455. Schiller, 449 F.3d at 294; Rocky Mountain Wild v. Walsh, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1246 (D.
Colo. 2016); see also Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
456. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012).
457. Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
458. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.7 (5th ed. 2010).

459. 192 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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understand its meaning.460 Moreover, late claims are sometimes
permitted. For example, it is possible to petition an agency for
amendment or rescission of the rule and then appeal, although this is less
likely to be successful for purely procedural claims.4 6' Thus, the window
under the general statute of limitations is not as limiting as one might
suppose.
Although it is uncertain what remedies courts will devise for
successful procedural claims, one option is to vacate the guidance. This
would nullify the guidance for all taxpayers retroactively. Because the
agency retains discretion to create a new rule using appropriate
procedure, courts cannot simply substitute a rule for the litigating
taxpayers so that the taxpayer and others in a similar position are in a tax
limbo, potentially hoping for the lapse of the permissible collection
period. To the extent vacatur occurs, tax law loses valuable consistency
because rules may change long after their issuance. This may also
exacerbate differences between those who voluntarily complied with the
law and those who either ignored it or planned for the challenge.
An alternative approach is to remand the guidance so that it is
changed only prospectively. However, remanding guidance works
poorly when the litigation occurs after enforcement action has
commenced because the court is dealing with a real taxpayer who needs
to know an actual tax result. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated in a
non-tax case that it did not impose its own interpretation because
"Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a
statute will be resolved by the implementing agency." 4 6 2
A reviewing court can order an agency to provide the relief it
denied only in the unusual case where the court concludes that
the underlying law and facts are such that the agency has no
discretion to act in any other manner, and then only when the
court concludes that a remand to the agency would produce
substantial injustice in the form of further delay of action to
which the petition is clearly entitled.4 63

460. Id. at 1034-35.
461. O'REILLY, supra note 125, § 15.14. "(C]hallenges to the procedural lineage of agency
regulations, whether raised by direct appeal, by petition for amendment or rescission of the
regulation or as a defense to an agency enforcement proceeding, will not be entertained outside the
60-day period provided by statute." JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
462. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999), quoted in Hickman, A Problem
ofRemedy, supra note 8, at 1195 n.191.
463. PIERCE, JR., supra note 458, § 18.1.
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Therefore, generally courts cannot direct the agency's actions because
under our separated powers system the agency must create the law.
Consequently, when enforcement has begun, remand for the agency to
create a new rule poorly addresses the problem for the complaining
taxpayer.
Between the difficulty of bringing procedural claims and the lack of
value to a litigant who is successful, there is a narrow funnel through
which procedural claims must flow. The result is that these cases may be
more of a distraction than a true means of remedying procedural
inadequacies. The better result may either be to eliminate such
challenges by carving tax out of the APA or to permit litigation over
procedural matters before the guidance is enforced. In addition, the tax
context may necessitate more immediate judicial relief than remand
when cases are brought post-enforcement. To gain greater judicial
direction, Congress would need to extend to courts the express power to
do so. 464

The current regime also poses the risk that, as taxpayers learn of
procedural ambiguities and their own inability to challenge the agency's
procedures, taxpayers may lose faith in the tax system and that, in turn,
may hurt compliance. 4 65 This is not to suggest that permitting the public
to comment on tax guidance will increase taxpayers' affection for the tax
system. However, foreclosing their voice may have the opposite effect.
Additionally, asking the public not to comply with rules issued by the
IRS or the Treasury Department in order to create a legal basis for a
challenge may threaten the voluntary, compliant tax system. The system
must encourage compliance when possible, so courts telling people to
deliberately fail to comply hoping to be assessed to permit a challenge to
the assessment is antithetical to the system.

464. A similar circumstance could be cases involving the denial of Social Security benefits in
which courts occasionally order the agency to take specific action rather than reconsider its
decision. In Social Security cases, however, the statute provides courts explicit authority to
"affirm[], modify[], or revers[e] the decision . .. with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012) (cited in Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at
1195 n.193).
465. I.R.S. OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 19 (2010) (finding it is

important to taxpayers that the I.R.S. fairly enforce tax laws); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1497-99 (2003)
(stating that punishing free-riders in the context of public goods may help maintain voluntary
contributions); Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute DeterrenceBackfire? Perceptions
and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND

ENFORCEMENT 193, 194-95 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (noting that perception of general tax
compliance is important to individual compliance decisions).
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PROPOSALS THAT BALANCE POLICY CONCERNS

If courts permit procedural challenges to tax guidance, this litigation
should occur before the guidance is enforced against taxpayers.
Although this would likely increase the cost of tax administration, it
would improve the law's consistency and better manage the use of the
agency's limited resources. Under current rules, pre-enforcement
litigation is rare because of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Declaratory
Judgment Act, and prudential justiciability constraints. This Part
proposes that Congress enact narrow statutory changes to the AntiInjunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act to funnel procedural
litigation before the application of tax guidance. Although this proposal
does not perfectly address all concerns about the Treasury Department's
and the IRS's failure to follow APA procedures, it balances concerns
regarding good procedure and good administration of the tax system.
The two changes proposed in this Article are premised on the
assumption that procedural litigation will occur. Proper procedure
provides the agency and the public the opportunity for voices to be heard
but does not guarantee a change in the agency's position. Those voices
may, however, change the shape of rules by influencing the way the
agency understands the issues. Because the voices only have the power
to persuade and to create a record for litigation, the timing of those
voices is critical to maximize their value. If a court or Congress carves
tax out of the APA, thus denying procedural constraints on agency
action, these proposals would be moot.
Together these two proposals remove the statutory block to preenforcement litigation and strengthen the case for finality and injuries in
fact. The first is a narrow amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act to permit procedural litigation before the
guidance's enforcement. The second proposal legislates the finality of
notices and recognizes the harm to non-recipient taxpayers from
narrowly tailored and exclusive favorable tax provisions. The first
proposal may operate to limit procedural litigation even as the second
operates to expand it. They seek to balance the best use of government
resources for all taxpayers. To do so, these proposals require
congressional action, something that is far from assured in today's
political environment. Nevertheless, they are an important step in
recognizing that courts cannot make consistent progress in this area
without greater assistance from the legislature.
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Narrow Exemption to Keep the Default

Congress intended the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory
Judgment Act to support the government's need to "raise revenue for
public purposes in the face of citizen recalcitrance;" therefore, any
exception to their prohibitions must be evaluated, at least in part, for the
extent to which the exception risks revenue.4 66 Procedural litigation
before tax enforcement minimally slows the IRS's collection processes,
reducing revenue. To minimize revenue loss, exceptions permitting this
early litigation must be narrowly drawn and, ideally, facilitate
enforcement after the litigation. To accomplish both objectives, this
section proposes Congress narrowly amend the Anti-Injunction Act and
the Declaratory Judgment Act to permit procedural litigation within a
finite number of days, for example ninety days, after tax guidance's
publication.46 7 Thereafter, procedural challenges would be foreclosed.
To resolve the issues discussed in this Article without opening
floodgates to litigation with unknown consequences, this exception to
current statutory prohibitions on pre-enforcement litigation for the
"assessment and collection of taxes" is limited to the Treasury
Department's and the IRS's compliance with the APA in the creation of
tax guidance. In other words, this proposal would permit preenforcement litigation of procedural requirements and a judicial
evaluation of whether the process used, including the clarity of the
statement and the comment period, suffices for APA purposes. For
example, commentators who felt the Treasury Department did not
properly respond to their comments could begin litigation of that matter
before the guidance is enforced.
In its limited form, this proposal purposefully does not repeal the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act or the tax exception in the Declaratory Judgment
Act. Instead of a wholesale change with unknowable effects, this
proposal limits the change to manage the risk of new litigation. The
agency has faced significant charges within the last decade, and as it
faces the demand to incorporate the APA more fully into its creation of
tax guidance, new burdens need to be circumspectly added. Thus, this
proposal urges moderation even as it advocates for important changes.
466. Asofsky, supra note 158, at 787.
467. Making wholesale changes to the standard would require crafting a line that other courts
would need to respect. Alternatively, courts would throw open the doors to tax litigation, something
they are unlikely to want to do based on their historic views of tax litigation, and something that is
dangerous at a time of an underfunded agency to fight that litigation. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or
Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REv. 517, 518, 525-26
(1994); Temkin, supra note 19.
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While addressing pressing concerns, the proposal also forces
congressional discussion of its expectations of administrative agencies.
Through debates over this statutory change, Congress would have to
define the extent to which it wants the Treasury Department and the IRS
to comply with the APA and, possibly, determine if there are acceptable
differences between the many types of tax guidance. Considering that an
open-ended statement permitting pre-enforcement litigation over APA
compliance may expand notice-and-comment to every facet of agency
life, it may not be unreasonable to expect Congress to take seriously the
need to weigh when procedure is most valuable. This line drawing is
difficult but not impossible.468
There is precedent for narrow exceptions permitting pre-enforcement
review similar to those proposed in this Article. To date, however, these
exceptions have focused on substantive law issues. For example, the
Revenue Act of 1978 made available declaratory judgments to
prospective issuers of certain government obligations.4 69 Positing an
"actual controversy" to determine whether state or local debt obligations
that are not yet issued are taxable rather than tax-exempt, the Tax Court
is granted the power to declare whether they are, or are not, taxexempt. 4 7 0 Not only is the subject matter limited, only the prospective
issuer can bring the suit and must first exhaust administrative
remedies.4 7 ' Finally, there is a ninety-one-day deadline for filing suit
after the IRS mails the determination letter to the state.472 This grants the
Tax Court jurisdiction, but not without limits, to hear South Carolina v.
Regan-type cases.
Similarly, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974473
granted the Tax Court the limited power to grant declaratory judgments
for certain issues relating to the qualification of select retirement
plans.474 Although requiring a case or controversy, this narrow exception
468. For example, with respect to the Tax Injunction Act, which applies to lower federal courts'
review of state tax law, courts persist in drawing distinctions between revenue raising and revenue
losing issues, the latter being subject to pre-enforcement review. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88,
108-09 (2004); Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1986); Wells v. Malloy, 510 F.2d 74, 77
(2d Cir. 1975). State level claims permit only constitutional challenges, as there is no equivalent to
the APA to require certain procedure.
469. Internal Revenue Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 336, 92 Stat. 2841, 2841-42 (1978)
(codified at I.R.C. § 7478 (2012)).
470. Id.
471. I.R.C. § 7478(b).
472. Id.
473. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 949 (1974).
474. Id. § 1041(a), 88 Stat. at 950, (codified at I.R.C. § 7476 (2012)).
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permits the court to evaluate the merits of an issue to aid in the creation
of retirement plans but only after exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In some ways broader than the exception for tax-exempt bonds, any
interested party under the regulations can pursue this claim. By creating
this type of review, Congress permits those who are interested to seek
resolution of matters before enforcement occurs.
In the form of a narrow exception, the language proposed in this
Article would reduce the importance of defining the assessment and
collection of taxes.475 Today, as shown in Direct Marketing Ass'n v.
Brohl,476 judges who want to hear procedural claims must fit the
substance of the guidance outside of the assessment and collection of
taxes in order to gain jurisdiction.4 77 This alternate path of redefining
terms risks broadening the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction and
Declaratory Judgment Acts, not only for procedural claims but for all
claims. In the process, courts might open Pandora's box to litigation in a
way that thwarts the revenue-raising objectives of these acts. A narrow
statutorily defined exception acknowledges Congress's goals without the
risk of unleashing havoc on tax administration.
By expanding review from current law, the proposal risks reducing
the issuance of rules; however, the alternative of delaying litigation
encourages the creation of rules that may be overturned by courts.47 8 The
only real advantage of delaying litigation is if the litigation never occurs.
To prefer that result, one must accept that the existence of guidance is
more important than that it be formed consistent with APA procedures,
in which case Congress should except tax from the APA. If APA
procedures matter in tax, there must be a method to ensure that the
procedure is followed.
475. Limiting the language to the narrow processes of assessment and collection as suggested by
the court in Altera Corp. v. Comm'r, 145 T.C. 3 (2015) would put tremendous pressure on these
terms as used in the processes of the Internal Revenue Code as it now operates, because those terms
were not so narrowly confided in 1867 when the Anti-Injunction Act was first enacted. Hickman
suggests that courts interpret the "purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax" as
more specifically and temporally proximate "assessment" and "collection" of taxes. Hickman, A
Problem of Remedy, supra note 8, at 1210. Hickman recognizes this might "push[] the pendulum
again back too far in favor ofjudicial review." Id. at 1213.
476. _ U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
477. Id. at 1133.
478. See supra note 60. Not everyone agrees that ossification occurs. Even if ossification
produces less guidance, reducing the amount of guidance may be necessary to ensure judicial
scrutiny of agency action. See Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A
Harder Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667 (1996); Thomas 0.
Sargentich, The Critique ofActive JudicialReview of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997); Seidenfeld, supra note 437.

2017]

PRE-ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION NEEDED

1395

Because this proposed exception, although narrow, would open up the
government to new litigation claims, limits on the litigation need to be
imposed to ensure these claims do not become overly burdensome to the
tax system. Moreover, these claims need to be constrained in order to
ensure the consistency of the law. Permitting unlimited procedural
challenges keeps the law in a state of flux until the end of the window
for such challenges, and potentially longer if such challenges are
permitted.
To limit the negative impact litigation over tax guidance would have
on the agency's revenue-raising function, the proposal suggests a
window of time when litigation over procedural issues may proceed.
Time limits are often jurisdictional, forcing the dismissal of claims if the
time has lapsed, although courts often interpret these limits narrowly.4 79
Thus, after the lapsed period, however narrowly interpreted, procedural
claims are foreclosed. This rule precluding future review at the
enforcement stage results from a compelling need to achieve consistent
application of the tax code on a national basis. For consistency in
application, the law needs to be settled; therefore, claims that do not go
to the substance of whether the guidance has a statutory basis must be
resolved and then put aside.
This limited time frame is consistent with the Administrative
Conference of the United States's recommendation. The Conference
recommends limiting review for complex areas of law because of the
need for regulatory certainty and the presence of unrecoverable costs if
the rule is overturned.48 0 "The uncertainty caused by the potential for
conflicting court decisions and by the possibility that a rule may be
overturned several years after its promulgation can be extremely
disruptive of the regulatory scheme."481 Moreover, limiting the period of
review should increase participation in the rulemaking process, bring
finality to the administrative process, and conserve administrative
resources. 4 8 2
For example, the statute at issue in Eagle-Picher Industries v.
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, 48 3 the Comprehensive Environmental

479. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 288-89 (1978); Eagle-Picher
Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Conun'n, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
480. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 82-7: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES
IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 3 (1982).

481. Id. at 2.
482. Id. at 3.
483. 759 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Response, Compensation Act and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
provided that:
Review of any regulation promulgated under [CERCLA] may
be . . made within ninety days from the date of promulgation of
such regulations. Any matter with respect to which review could
have been obtained under this subsection shall not be subject to
judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for
enforcement or to obtain damages or recovery of response
costs.

484

This provision successfully limited the court and the timing in which
cases could be heard.48 5 Even though the court grappled with issues of
ripeness in its interpretation of its jurisdiction, the court accepted the
limit as it applied.
Despite much successful litigation on the topic of time limits, some
courts may refuse to accept this type of limitation. For example, courts
have ignored these types of limitations when they find petitioners lacked
a meaningful opportunity to challenge the action during the review
period because of a lack of notice, a lack of ripeness, or confusion in the
law as to the proper forum of review.4 86 Similarly, courts may wait to
hear challenges until after guidance is applied in order to prove
sufficient hardship to warrant review.487 But these arguments are
carefully scrutinized because of Congress's stated desire to limit the
review. Additionally, ripeness is less likely to be a concern within the
narrow confines of procedural litigation.
Nevertheless, despite this proposal's focus on procedural issues, some
substantive issues would be litigated before enforcement, such as
whether the Treasury Department's reading was consistent with the
statute. However, the proposal does not close the door on future
litigation of those substantive matters as well. Although litigants would
lose the ability to litigate over specific APA procedural rights after the
window closes, they would retain their right to litigate whether the
guidance comports with the language of the statute. In doing so, the
proposal seeks to encourage a focused look at procedure at the time
guidance is issued and shortly thereafter, and then put the procedure to
bed so that attention turns to the guidance's substance.
484. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1982).
485. Eagle-Picher,759 F.2d at 909.
486. Recreation Vehicle Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 653 F.2d 562, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Geller v.
FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors, 551 F.2d 1270,
1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
487. E.g., Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Costle, 580 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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One result of the proposal would be that some people initially
indifferent or unaware of the guidance will not have the opportunity to
litigate procedural matters when later affected by the guidance.4 88
However, this curtailment of claims currently exists, although with
longer windows, from the application of the general six-year statute of
limitations.489 Moreover, shorter windows better balance the competing
priorities these issues raise: holding agencies to the standards of the
APA but also managing agency and judicial resources and creating
reliable tax guidance. Shorter windows also encourage people to
participate in the creation of guidance, the purpose for which the
procedures were enacted, rather than waiting until after the fact to
bemoan the result. This would ultimately strengthen the APA's goal of
fostering public involvement in rule-making.
A final question is which courts should hear these claims. Generalist
courts are likely preferable for this pre-enforcement litigation because
substantive tax knowledge is not required. One could question the
appropriateness of delegating federal procedural matters under the APA
to a court specializing in substantive tax matters. Furthermore, retaining
these cases in general federal courts would likely facilitate uniformity in
administrative law as well as remove more of the silo around tax's
procedures.
On the other hand, Congress could justifiably give the Tax Court the
authority to hear these cases, despite the Tax Court having no particular
specialty in administrative law. Although it has not been proven, the Tax
Court might be more sympathetic to the difficulty of creating, and the
need for, tax guidance. If Congress chose for these matters to be
reviewed by the Tax Court, it would need to extend its jurisdiction.
Under current law, Tax Court cases must involve refund procedures or
other matters specifically granted jurisdiction by Congress.4 90 Therefore,
although most tax cases originate in the Tax Court, its jurisdiction does
not currently extend to purely procedural claims.
There are risks to this proposal, even for those solely focused on
taxpayers' rights. To the extent pre-enforcement litigation grows as a
share of the Treasury Department's budget, it reduces the ability to
engage in other activities. Those other activities, such as taxpayer
education and responding to questions, may provide a larger benefit to
488. See Graceba Total Conunc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 115 F.3d 1038, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Functional Music Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
489. See Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006).
490. I.R.C. §§ 6213-6214, 7442; I.R.M. § 35.1.1 (Aug. 11, 2004), https://www.irs.gov/irm/
part35/irm 35-001-001.html [https://perma.cc/T7VR-T74R].
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taxpayers than litigation over guidance. The cost in terms of these other
activities is greater because of the relative difficulty of cutting funding
from, or ignoring, taxpayer litigation. Once litigation is allowed, the
agency must devote resources to it if the agency is to retain the guidance.
It is the proverbial squeaky wheel that demands resources to oil.
Recognizing that it is difficult to create good guidance and that not
everyone has the best of intentions with procedural litigation, this
proposal seeks a balance. The proposal seeks to balance the need for
guidance created with procedures that are respected by the agency and
the public with the need for some limits on tax litigation. To do so, this
proposed change would permit procedural litigation that meets the
justiciability rules but does not permit this long after guidance has been
operational.
B.

Recognizing the Injury

Although the first proposal permits pre-enforcement litigation for
those who could litigate the issues after the fact, it does not expand the
issues to be litigated or the group who may engage in this litigation. To
accomplish that feat is difficult, if not impossible. Some of the
justiciability limitations that prevent third-party suits and early litigation
are constitutional. They cannot be waived even with congressional
action. This second proposal accepts that limitation but has Congress
legislate recognition of the finality of, and possible injury from,
guidance that works to change taxpayer behavior even though not in the
form of final regulations. Additionally, Congress's enactment would
explain to the courts its understanding of how injuries exist with certain
agency action and that third parties may be harmed when other taxpayers
are given tax benefits.
First, Congress should statutorily designate the forms of guidance that
are subject to review. This list should include regulations and all tax
guidance intended to change taxpayer behavior. Others have tied this
issue to the deference given to tax guidance or the potential for
triggering tax penalties; however, the more critical issue is the ability the
agency has to influence behavior with guidance that was not given
491
democratic review.
By limiting this proposal to guidance intended to change taxpayer
behavior, every agency action will not be subject to notice-andcomment. Only prospective rules are intended to change, as opposed to
define, prior action. Additionally, the focus on changing behavior limits
491. Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supranote 8.
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the guidance subject to review to that altering baseline behavior rather
than merely clarifying the application of the law. If Congress does not
want a piece of forward-looking guidance to go through notice-andcomment, for example if it wants to facilitate the listing of listed
transactions, Congress can exempt the guidance from the APA in its
statute.
Consider the following example to clarify the distinction. The IRS
issued Revenue Ruling 2001-4 to define the extent an airline can
refurbish an airplane and claim a current deduction for the cost rather
than booking it as a capital expenditure.492 The rule clarifies the
application of the law to mitigate taxpayers' need to find an answer.
Under the proposal, this clarifying ruling would not be reviewable for
testing whether it completed notice-and-comment. On the other hand,
the notice warning of impending inversion regulations or the notice
classifying transactions as listed transactions are forward looking and
changes the law that previously existed. These notices are intended to
change behavior and, therefore, the proposal requires they go through
notice-and-comment unless an exemption is statutorily provided.
This proposal would have produced different outcomes in some
historical cases. It would likely have changed the result in Cohen, the
case involving refund procedures, because refunds involve past
taxpaying behavior.4 93 Guidance that imposes information reporting
obligations would be reviewable depending on what the guidance does.
If the guidance imposes new obligations rather than clarifying old ones,
the guidance would require notice-and-comment and be subject to preenforcement litigation. Thus, the proposal is not a bright-line rule but,
nonetheless, imposes greater clarity and order than the existing, evolving
common law.
Although subjecting many forms of tax guidance to procedural
review, this proposal does not suggest that Congress eliminate the varied
forms of guidance. Congress should, however, require that all guidance
intended to change behavior be held to the same level of review. In taxspeak, substance should triumph over form. Even if a rule is not in a
regulation, it should have the same opportunity for public comment if it
has the same impact on the public.
Listing guidance that is subject to the APA's notice-and-comment
procedures reduces the likelihood of successful agency defenses on the
ground the guidance is not yet ripe. However, the law is not clear in this
492. Rev. Rul. 2001-3, 2001-1 C.B. 295.
493. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 946 (2015).
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area, therefore congressional opinion may not sway a court. Under
current law, non-legislative rules may not be ripe for judicial review,
although some non-legislative rules have been determined to be ripe
even though the direct injury or harm will not arise until (and unless)
enforcement action occurs.494 Congressional action cannot undo the
uncertainty in this area of jurisprudence but does mitigate it as much as
possible.
Second, Congress should legislate that, because of federal budget
constraints, all taxpayers are injured by the application of tax reducing
guidance. 49 5 This is not arguing the government is entitled to all of a
taxpayer's income. It is arguing that tax preferences for some are
inherently discriminatory against others, although possibly for good
reasons. Although it might be politically popular to frame taxes as the
taxpayer versus the government, in reality the better view is the taxpayer
versus other taxpayers. As one taxpayer pays less in tax, to raise the
same amount of revenue tax rates on others must increase. Even without
the tax increase, the person who pays less tax has benefited relative to
those who do not.
Preferential treatment for some taxpayers receive narrow support
from policymakers, while other preferences are created through
democratic means. If the benefit is justified, as defined by society, the
tax discrimination is fair and appropriate. The issue for this Article is not
whether a particular form of favoritism is justified, but who gets to
decide if the benefit is justified. When Congress enacts tax preferences,
they are democratic even if sometimes unwise. When an agency creates
a preference, it is less likely the preference is recognized as of
democratic, rather than bureaucratic, origin. Only through the imposition
of procedures, such as notice-and-comment, can the public be certain of
its voice in the creation of the benefit.
Moreover, this Article argues the procedure for creating the benefit
should be subject to the same review as a tax burden would be. The
irony of today's system is that people can fight over the creation of tax
burdens but not tax relief even though economists conclude they are the
same.496 To impose a tax on one half of the country is economically
equivalent to giving a tax break to the other half. Perhaps it derives from
people's fear of loss, but the taxpaying public is more passive to benefits
given to others. This proposal ignores that sentiment and recognizes the
494. Compare Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808-11 (2003), with
Sabre, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
495. For the recognition of the likely prudential challenges, see Part IV.
496. See discussion supra note 277.
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economic equivalence-not preventing either taxes or preferences but
holding both to the same procedural standard.
Through these two additions to existing statutory language, Congress
strengthens the claim for the public to litigate procedural matters in tax
guidance. This would open the door to court for rules that might
otherwise never face judicial challenge. In the process, it furthers one
purpose of the APA, to ensure the public's involvement in the creation
of the rules affecting the public by pushing them into a more democratic
process. Not only would the litigation be more democratic because of
more participants, it encourages the agency to adopt more democratic
procedures.
Thus, one point of this second proposed change is to increase the
amount of litigation the IRS faces. In doing so, it would impose a cost
on the tax system. That cost should be weighed in the decision to accept
this proposal; however, it is a necessary cost if the government is to hear
relevant procedural claims. It is an example of the necessary balancing
of individual equity and administrability that must be undertaken if the
tax system is to function fairly. To the extent that guidance has a
negative effect on others, those others should be given the opportunity to
voice their complaints in a meaningful way about the undemocratic
nature of the guidance's creation. Although these complainants can go to
Congress, access to courts offers the possibility of more meaningful
review, as recognized by the creation of the APA itself.
Broadening the litigation pool is not without risk, however. Not only
is it costly, permitting the voice of those not directly affected by
guidance might have the unintended consequence of making it a tool for
entrenchment. Regulatory capture theories suggest that businesses and
the wealthy might influence policies not directly of interest to
themselves in order to further their own interests in other ways. In tax, it
is possible well established groups might litigate in order to free up
revenue to fund their own projects or because of a dislike of those with
less power. In other words, in a world of unintended consequences,
opening the door to speakers does not guarantee the voices one would
want or what those voices will say. Litigants may usurp courts to engage
in a "kind of private conscription of public resources ... that undermines
a fully democratic effort . .. to allocate . . . limited [agency] resources to

the most serious problems."4 97
This risk of usurpation is not specific to litigation over procedural
matters and is of less concern in this context because the stakes are
497. Sunstein, supra note 231, at 631.
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relatively low. In other words, there is less risk of people engaging in
pre-enforcement procedural litigation for reasons other than a concern
with process because it is a narrowly defined exception to the
prohibition on pre-enforcement litigation and should only change how
rules are made rather than necessarily their substance. Making this
incremental change to the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment
Act provides an experiment to see exactly how the public will respond
without a risk to the system overall.
Even if Congress is persuaded to enact these changes, the future of
the litigation would likely have an uphill judicial battle. As discussed in
Part II, courts do not always recognize a connection between tax
expenditures and spending much less between those who benefit from
tax expenditures and those who do not. "Bare procedural violations"
without a direct harm do not satisfy the injury in fact requirement;
however, the proposal goes further and argues that an actual
particularized injury occurs, although one that exists for all recipients of
government programs. 4 98 The constitutional requirement of injury in fact
makes it harder to gain access for third-party suits in the tax context
other than in the particular factual situation of Flast, and this proposal
attempts to supply that injury. But courts may dismiss the harm.
Although some courts may be reluctant, others may accept this as an
opportunity to hear cases they are already moving to hear. Courts at
times have been open to future harms or probabilistic harms as creating
the requisite injury in fact. For example, in 2010 in Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms,49 9 an agency approved unconditional deregulation
of a particular genetically modified alfalfa plant without a study required
by law."* Growers of conventional alfalfa sued on the grounds the
deregulation violated the enabling statute. The lower courts sided with
the conventional alfalfa growers and enjoined the planting of the
modified alfalfa. Although reversing the injunction, the Supreme Court
upheld the farmers' standing even though their injuries were
characterized by marketers as alleged risks of future contamination. On
the other hand, in 2009, in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,"o' the
Court held there was no standing for plaintiffs after the Forest Service
approved a salvage sale of tracts of national forest land because there
502
were no particularized affidavits to prove the injury in fact. The
498. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, _ U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
499. 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
500. Id. at 152-55.
501. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
502. Id. at 494-96.
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determination of standing in these cases is very much facts- and
circumstances-specific so it is impossible to predict with certainty how
courts will respond to this proposal. Nevertheless, with the current trend
toward permitting procedural tax litigation, Congress should use the
opportunity to make the litigation as comprehensive as possible.
Courts generally permit Congress to limit prudential limitations and
have respected congressional grants for citizen suits. For example, in
Bennett v. Spear,"o3 the Supreme Court addressed the citizen suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that authorizes "any
person" to sue to challenge certain violations of the act.504 The Fish and
Wildlife Service had issued an opinion on a reservoir; ranch operators
and irrigation districts sued arguing the Fish and Wildlife Service did not
use best scientific and commercial data available to create the rule as
required by the ESA. The Court recognized that the ESA's broad
authorization of people to bring suits overturns the prudential
requirement that the person's interests be within the zone of interest
protected by the statute.
Therefore, to succeed, this proposal needs Congress to expressly state
that it intends to waive the agency's common law defenses to preenforcement litigation in order to permit procedural claims by any
person. Additionally, Congress must acknowledge that guidance
intended to shape taxpayer behavior, even if designated by the agency as
interpretive, is final for review. Finally, courts must recognize the
statement as explaining that harms are, in fact, created when the
Treasury Department or the IRS creates targeted preferences or
anticipatory guidance to permit review.
To be clear, this proposal does not vest judicial power over the policy
choices contained within the guidance. Instead, the proposal provides
that agencies cannot extend the law without using the same proper
procedure necessary for all rules. In doing so, the proposal creates a
more reasonable and fair tax system for everyone involved. The same
tools that the APA extends to the public in other contexts would be
employed in tax, and the judiciary would be recognized as the best
means of following through with procedural challenges.
CONCLUSION
The Treasury Department and the IRS are given substantial discretion
in creating the rules that implement the tax system. However, that
503. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
504. Id. at 162-64.
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discretion is circumscribed by the APA, which demands procedures for
the exercise of agency discretion. Unless Congress limits the application
of the APA, the issuance of rules must be according to the arduous
procedure laid out in statute. This is not an endorsement of forcing
everything agencies do to go through notice-and-comment. However,
until Congress legislates otherwise, courts must decipher what the APA
requires for every piece of tax guidance, and taxpayers and the agency
are left in limbo not knowing when notice-and-comment applies.
Tax's special statutory limitations and limited standing rules that
historical
the
highlight
litigation
pre-enforcement
prohibit
exceptionalism of the tax system. If the tax system is now to operate like
every other administrative system, the procedural rules protecting it need
to be carefully evaluated to ensure they work in the new world order.
The worst of all worlds is to create procedural challenges that can only
be used by those seeking last-ditch efforts to eliminate their personal tax
liabilities rather than trying to create a just and democratic tax system. If
the old system is to be dismantled, the dismantling should be
thoughtfully done.
With the more frequent application of the APA to tax matters and the
impact this has on the legitimacy of tax guidance, it has become clear
that the litigation over procedures needs to occur before widespread
reliance on the guidance. To permit this pre-enforcement litigation will
require statutory change. That change needs to be circumspect because
litigation imposes risks on the existence of the guidance itself and,
perhaps more importantly, the tax agency's budget. In a world of
shrinking budgets, the Treasury Department currently spends three and
one-half percent of its budget creating guidance."os Although the
Department of Justice handles most tax litigation, a portion of the
Treasury Department's tax enforcement budget is spent on litigation
support. Broadening exceptions to permit ever more litigation may
prevent the IRS and the administration from engaging in other, equally
valuable efforts for taxpayers because litigation is not the end sought but
the more democratic creation of guidance.
That the proposals contained herein would increase the amount of
litigation might bankrupt the tax system in much the same way as simply
repealing the Tax Injunction Act. However, these narrow proposals are a
necessary protection for taxpayer rights when accepting that procedural
attacks will be permitted. And they do so in the narrowest way possible.
If drug manufacturers deserved pre-enforcement understanding of the
505. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE BUDGET IN BRIEF 13-14 (2015).
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law that was to apply in Abbott Laboratories,so too should taxpayers be
entitled to that same information. Encouraging taxpayers to break the
law in order to test its procedural integrity is a poor way to encourage
faith in the federal tax system.
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